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ABSTRACT 
STATE-BASED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND TERRORISM 
By Eray Karlidag, Ph.D. 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.  
!
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2017.  
Major Director: Dr. Nancy A. Morris, Ph.D. 
L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs 
In this dissertation, I examine the within-country and between-country effects of state-
based human rights violations on annual counts of total, fatal and attributed attacks. I use the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) for my outcome variables and Political Terror Scale (PTS) 
to measure state-based human rights violations.  
 Scholars argue that repressive governments that silence dissidents and close all 
avenues of political expression increase the likelihood of terrorism and other acts of violence 
against the state (Gurr, 1970; Crenshaw, 1981; DeNardo, 1985; Piazza, 2017). In such 
circumstances, terrorism and acts of violence against the state may serve as a defense 
mechanism against repressive governments (Gurr, 1970). Others argue that state-based 
violations of human rights can damage public approval and perceptions of legitimacy towards 
the government (Piazza, 2017). This, in turn, fosters anti-state and anti-status quo grievances. 
Such polarized environments become vulnerable to extremist movements in regard to the 
gathering of support, recruitment of new members, and distribution of effective propaganda, 
all of which may result in increased terrorist attacks at the country-level (Walsh and Piazza, 
2010).  
I use the fixed effects negative binomial regression model to test the effects of within-
country changes in state-based human rights violations on annual changes in terrorism. I use 
generalized hierarchical linear modeling to test the effects of between-country changes in 
   
!
state-based human rights violations on annual changes in terrorism. Using country-level data 
from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), Political Terror Scale (PTS), Polity IV, Freedom 
House and the World Bank, I examine the relationship between state-based human rights 
violations and terrorism for 175 countries between 1980 and 2014.  
The results indicate that state-based human rights violations is significantly and positively 
correlated with annual terrorism. The results regarding human rights violations are consistent 
for both within-country and between-country differences. Increases in human rights 
violations within a country results in increase in the number of terrorist attacks. Similarly, 
countries which have higher human rights violations also have high frequency of annual 
terrorist attacks.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In the mid-2000s there was a steady increase in the number of global terrorist attacks, 
reaching its peak in 2012 (LaFree, Dugan, and Miller, 2015). In spite of global increases in 
terrorism over time, recent studies examining country-level terrorism trends indicate that there is 
considerable variation in terrorism trends over time (LaFree, Morris and Dugan, 2009; LaFree et 
al., 2015). Many studies examining the correlates of country-level terrorism have focused on the 
effects of political variables, such as democracy and state failure, on country-level terrorism 
trends (Abadie, 2006; Burgoon, 2006; Blomberg and Hess, 2008; Freytag, Kruger, Meirerrieks, 
Schneider, 2011; Li and Schaub , 2004; Li, 2005; Piazza, 2007; Piazza, 2006; Fahey and LaFree, 
2015). State failure is broadly defined as a state`s inability or its unwillingness to protect their 
citizens (Chomsky, 2006; Piazza, 2008). The existing literature has conceptualized state failure 
in two ways: (1) the state’s loss of monopoly of using force due to various conflicts and tensions 
(Piazza, 2008) and (2) the state’s use of repressive and aggressive acts upon its citizenry 
(Chomsky, 2006; Walsh and Piazza, 2010). There is evidence for the effects of both types of 
state failure on country-level terrorism ( Lai, 2007; Piazza, 2007; Piazza, 2008; Fahey and 
LaFree, 2015; Piazza and Walsh, 2010; Piazza, 2017). For example, studies using measures of 
state failure that capture internal conflict and loss of state power have found that countries 
involved in ethnic wars, genocide, and adverse regime changes have a higher incidence of 
terrorism (Piazza, 2007; Piazza, 2008). Similarly, studies examining the relationship between 
state-based use of repressive and aggressive acts and terrorism have reported that countries with 
greater protections of human and physical integrity rights have fewer terrorist attacks (Piazza and 
Walsh, 2010; Walsh and Piazza, 2010).  
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There are several compelling reasons to further examine the relationship between state-
based human rights violations and the probability a country will experience a terrorist attack. 
First, some scholars have argued that states may use repressive acts to fight against terrorism and 
justify these acts as an “act of prevention” or an “act of deterrence” or as “retaliatory 
measures”(Shor, Charmichael, Nazif Munoz, Shandra, and Schwartz, 2014). Thus, it has been a 
general tendency for some states to use repressive acts assuming these types of policies are going 
to deter future terrorist attacks. Second, prior studies examining state-based human rights 
violations and country-level terrorism do not examine data beyond the early 2000s. However, 
this was largely due to lack of data at the time, and as recent data on terrorism has become more 
available, a more up to date analysis is necessary. Recent world events, such as the Arab Spring 
and the increased activity of ISIS, suggests that state-based actions may have changed for some 
countries during this period of time. Third, although previous studies on the country-level 
correlates of country-level terrorism have undoubtedly provided important findings, they have 
not attempted to examine or disentangle the between-country and within-country effects of state-
based failure on country-level terrorism trends. As other scholars have noted, longitudinal data 
for multiple units over time contain data about both between and within-unit differences (Curran 
and Bauer, 2010; Raudensbush and Bryk, 2002). The majority of prior longitudinal studies of 
country-level terrorism have not taken into account the confounding of within and between-
country effects on terrorism.  
Using data for 175 countries from 1980 to 2014, I expand upon the existing research by 
examining the between-country effects and within-country effects of state-based violations of 
human rights on country-level terrorism. To measure terrorism, I use data from the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD), a database maintained by the National Center for the Study of 
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Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The GTD contains data on annual terrorist 
events for more than 200 countries, nations, and territories and is considered one of the most 
comprehensive open-source databases on terrorist attacks (LaFree et al., 2015). The GTD defines 
terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by non-state actors to 
attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” 
(LaFree et al., 2015, p. 13). Whereas most studies have used state-based human rights violations 
measures from the Cingranelli and Richards` (2004) (CIRI) Human Rights database, I use a less 
studied measure of state-based human rights violations taken from the Amnesty International. 
State-based violations of human rights are defined as state-sponsored extrajudicial killing, torture 
or similar physical abuse, disappearances, and political incarceration (Wood and Gibney, 2010). 
I test two hypotheses. First, I hypothesize that within-country increases in state-based violations 
of human rights are related to increases in terrorism within countries, while controlling for the 
effects of other social, demographic, political and economic variables, such as economic 
development (GDP) and growth, population, regime length, and democratization.  Second, I 
hypothesize that between-country differences in the level of state-based terrorism is also 
significantly related to increased terrorism over time, while controlling for the effects of other 
social, demographic, political and economic variables. I use several analytical models to test 
these hypotheses, including a fixed effects negative binomial model to examine within-country 
effects of state-based human rights violations on terrorism, and hierarchical multi-level modeling 
techniques to examine between-country effects of state-based human rights violations on 
terrorism.    
 This chapter briefly introduces the main focus of my dissertation, the reasons for 
examining the effects of state-based human rights violations on country-level terrorism, and the 
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outline of the dissertation. In Chapter 2, I thoroughly discuss the conceptual definition of 
terrorism, the issues surrounding the definition, and briefly describe measurement issues 
associated with collecting terrorism data. I provide the justification for using open source 
databases for country-level terrorism research, and discuss advantages and disadvantages of open 
source databases of terrorism. Chapter 2 concludes with a brief discussion of several major 
existing databases of terrorism. Chapter 3 begins with a brief review of the demographic, 
economic, political and social correlates of country-level terrorism. Because the focus of my 
dissertation is state-based human rights violations and terrorism, I focus more heavily on the 
conceptual issues and theoretical expectations for the effects of state-based human rights 
violations. I provide theoretical explanations of state-based human rights violations and country-
level terrorism that are rooted in both the political science and criminological literature. Finally, I 
provide a detailed discussion of the existing empirical evidence on the effects of country-level 
state-based human rights violations and terrorism. In Chapter 4, I discuss the data and 
methodology for the current study. I begin with a discussion of the unit of analysis and the 
sample of countries included in the analysis. I discuss the protocol as well as the advantages and 
disadvantages of the databases used to create my variables of interest. Finally, I present the 
hypotheses I test, as well as the analytic strategy implemented in this study. Chapter 5 presents 
descriptive statistics and results from the within-country and between-country analyses of state-
based human rights violations on annual terrorism counts over time. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses 
the main findings of the current study. Additionally, I discuss the limitations of the current study, 
directions for future research, and conclude with a brief discussion of the potential policy 
implications of the current study. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Conceptualization 
In this chapter I discuss the conceptual and measurement issues associated with defining 
and studying terrorism. I then discuss the differences between traditional sources of crime data 
and terrorism data collected using open source data sets, with a focus on the advantages and 
disadvantages of open source data for the study of country-level terrorism. Finally, I discuss the 
most frequently used open source databases of terrorism with a focus on their definition and 
inclusion criteria. 
2.1 Definition of Terrorism 
Most scholars agree that there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism (Chaliand 
and Blin, 2007). Some (Chaliand and Blin, 2007) have argued that terrorism is subjective; that is, 
terrorism has different meanings for different people. Perhaps the most famous statement 
regarding this issue was made by the Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat 
in a 1974 speech before the United Nations: "One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom 
fighter" (United Nations General Assembly, 1974).  
Merari (2007) has argued that in the absence of a general acceptance of the underlying 
assumptions and semantics necessary to construct a definition of terrorism, it is impossible to 
provide a definition that is accepted by all. Schmid (2004) stated that because there are many 
types of "terrorism," with different forms and manifestations, and because the meaning of the 
term has undergone changes in the more than 200 years of its existence, terrorism is difficult to 
define. For instance, Rapoport (2004), in his analysis of modern terrorism, identified four 
different waves of terrorism: the anarchist wave, the anti-colonial wave, the new left wave, and 
the religious wave. Rapoport (2004) argues that the strategies, ideologies, and tactics used by 
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terrorist groups in each wave of terrorism have different characteristics.1 Despite the definitional 
ambiguity surrounding an exact definition of terrorism, there are conceptual similarities among 
the many existing definitions of terrorism in the literature. 
The origin of the word "terrorism" itself, the Latin word terrere, means "to frighten." 
Many scholars argue that terrorism, unlike like other acts, is designed to instill fear in a broad 
range of people (Moghadam, 2006). Schmid and Jongman (1988) reviewed 109 studies of 
terrorism and found several common themes. According to their analysis, 83.5 percent of 
terrorism definitions refer to violence, 65.0 percent refer to political goals, and 51.0 percent 
emphasize inflicting fear and terror (Schmid and Jongman, 1988). Only 21 percent of these 
definitions mentioned arbitrariness or indiscriminate targeting and only 17.5 percent of them 
indicated victimization of civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, or outsiders (Schmid and Jongman, 
1988). Thus, although there is debate surrounding the exact definition of terrorism, conceptual 
similarities across definitions of terrorism have allowed for the creation of several commonly 
used measurements of terrorism. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The first wave, the anarchist wave, began in the 1880s and continued through the 1920s. The 
increasing gap between bourgeoisie and proletariat was the primary motivator for the anarchist 
wave. Assassinations against high-level state officials were the main tactic. The second wave, 
anti-colonial wave, was active between the 1920s and the 1960s. After World War I, national 
self-determination ideology was the motivator. The tactics used in the second wave were 
assassinations against security forces and guerilla-like (hit-and-run) tactics against troops. The 
third wave, the new left wave, began in the 1960s and ended in the 1990s. Influenced by the 
Vietnam War, the Marxist Revolution was the dominant ideology in the third wave. Hijackings 
and kidnapping were the main tactics. Finally, the fourth wave, or the religious wave, started 
around the 1980s. Religious extremism is the main motivator of this wave. Suicide bombings are 
the most frequently used tactic (Rapoport, 2004).  
In addition to these waves, more recent literature (Kaplan, 2010; Post, McGinnis, and Moody, 
2014) argue that a fifth wave of terrorism has already emerged. For instance, Post et al. (2014) 
propose a typology of lone wolf terrorism in which, with the communications revolution, 
especially social media, terrorists are radicalized through the Internet. Other than lone wolf 
terrorism, Kaplan (2010) proposes new tribalism in which terrorists focus on local enemies rather 
than international, and distinguish enemies based on intense ethnic, racial, or tribal affiliation.!
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2.2 Measurement of Terrorism 
 Although there are similarities between terrorism and crime more generally, the 
measurement and collection of terrorism data is very different from that of crime data. While 
there are traditionally three forms of data in criminology -- (1) official data collected by 
authorized agents, (2) victimization data collected from victims and non-victims, and (3) self-
reported data collected from offenders -- these approaches are, unfortunately, often not suitable 
for the collection of terrorism data. Several scholars have noted the challenges associated with 
collecting terrorism data as compared to other cross-national sources of crime data (LaFree and 
Dugan, 2007; LaFree, Morris and Dugan, 2009). 
 First, there is no nationwide or international official database for terrorism. While there 
are universally accepted definitions for certain crimes, such as homicide, there is no such 
definition for terrorism (LaFree et al., 2009). Therefore, the terrorist organization of one country 
can be considered revolutionaries for another. For instance, Hamas is listed as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization for the United States; however, it maintains its status as a legitimate political party 
in some countries (LaFree, Morris, and Dugan, 2009). Even though some states do collect data 
on terrorism, the validity of these data are sometimes questioned due to political issues in those 
states (LaFree et al., 2009). Additionally, many countries consider and label the activities of most 
terrorist suspects criminal offenses, such as weapons violations and tax fraud, rather than 
terrorism itself (LaFree et al., 2009). 
 Second, collecting victimization data is also unlikely for terrorism researchers. One of the 
main reasons is that despite the significant levels of media attention and coverage on terrorist 
attacks, the number of terrorist attacks is very rare compared to other violent crimes. Therefore, 
it is very difficult to find victims of terrorist attacks even in very large samples (LaFree et al., 
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2009). Also, because victims of a terrorist attack are generally selected at random, perpetrators 
remain unknown in most cases, resulting in a severe shortage of details about the offender. 
Additionally, as in the study of homicide, victims of terrorist attacks are often killed, thus 
making victimization data unavailable (LaFree et al., 2009). 
 Third, even though self-reported data on terrorists could also provide information, it also 
has significant limitations. First, most active terrorists are unwilling to participate in interviews. 
Even if they do, the clandestine nature of those groups and the methods and means to collect data 
rarely meet the accepted academic criteria for data collection (Merari, 1991). 
2.3 Open Source Terrorism Databases 
 As a result of these challenges in collecting terrorism data, open source datasets are an 
alternative to traditional criminological data collection methods. Open source databases contain 
terrorism data generated primarily by media sources. The earliest open source database on 
terrorism data started in the late 1960s, which coincides with improvements in mass 
communication, especially the use of portable cameras with satellite technology that allows for 
instantaneous transmission of stories and pictures (Morris and LaFree, 2016). Media-based 
reports of terrorism have been used to create both open source offender and incident-level data 
sets (Silke 2008; LaFree and Dugan 2007). Many scholars have argued that the attention-seeking 
nature of terrorist attacks is one advantage of using open source terrorism data sets (Jenkins, 
1975; Schmid and De Graaf, 1982; LaFree and Dugan, 2007).  
For example, Jenkins (1975) states that terrorist attacks, unlike most traditional crime, are 
planned to attract the attention of electronic media and international press with the goal of 
spreading the psychological effects of the attacks. As a result, there is a strong association 
between media and terrorism. This has led Schmid and De Graaf (1982) to succinctly conclude, 
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“Without communication there can be no terrorism” (p.9). Similarly, Jenkins (1975) describes 
terrorism as “theatre” (p. 16), highlighting the attention-seeking nature of terrorism events. 
Therefore, the use of media to gather data could be an effective way to track terrorism (LaFree 
and Dugan, 2007). Finally, improvements in technology have improved open source data 
collection over time (Morris and LaFree, 2016).  
 Although open source data sets are useful, they do have weaknesses. Morris and LaFree 
(2016) state that regional bias and selection bias are two major weaknesses that open source 
databases can face. Regional bias refers to the possibility that some areas may underreport 
terrorist attacks. For instance, Woolley (2000) states that most media disproportionately cover 
events that occur in urban areas. Additionally, certain areas have more media coverage and wire 
service offices (Morris and LaFree 2016) that make the coverage of events much easier than in 
other areas lacking such facilities. Furthermore, Drakos and Gofas (2006) found that regime type 
in a region is significantly related to underreporting  of terrorist activity. For instance, countries 
where there is a dictatorship or restrictions to freedom of press may underreport terrorism events. 
Similar to regional bias, selection bias is also a weakness for obtaining comprehensive 
coverage of terrorist attacks. In the case of terrorism reporting, selection bias occurs if more 
newsworthy terrorist attacks are reported by the media. For example, terrorist attacks that result 
in less physical damage or no fatalities are more likely to be excluded from media reports than 
attacks with more fatalities or casualties (Woolley, 2000). In addition to these biases, Morris and 
LaFree (2016) highlight another bias which may impact terrorism data. Morris and LaFree 
(2016) state that after the occurrence of a high-profile attack, such as the Oklahoma City 
bombing, the sensitivity of media for such events may increase and result in increased number of 
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media reports about similar attacks. Surette (1999) has referred to the possible increase is media 
reporting as an "echo effect.”  
Despite these limitations, open source databases have significant advantages. First, most 
open source databases use multiple and different sources to gather data to overcome potential 
weaknesses (Morris and LaFree, 2016; Woolley, 2000). Second, the strength of the association 
between terrorism and media coverage is the strongest argument for the use of open source 
databases. As Jenkins (1975) and Schmid and De Graaf (1982) state, in contrast to ordinary 
criminals who seek to hide themselves and their actions, terrorists plan their attacks precisely to 
be recognized by local and international media. Thus, LaFree et al. (2015) state that while more 
typical crime rates, such as burglary and fraud, cannot be accurately tracked by studying 
electronic and print media, it is a defensible argument to claim that terrorism can be monitored in 
these ways. For instance, an aerial hijacking or politically-motivated assassination has a very 
high probability of being covered by global media (LaFree et al., 2015).  
Third, while most cross-national crime databases are limited to a small number of highly 
industrialized western-style democracies, most open source databases on terrorism collect 
information from every country of the world (LaFree et al., 2015). In addition to these 
advantages, Morris and LaFree (2016) state that objective acts, such as event counts rather than 
the interpretation of events, and "large and violent events" (p.7) are more likely to be reported 
without bias. 
 As a result of the recognition that media is an important space to track terrorism, the use 
of open source data sets and quantitative terrorism studies has increased over time. While early 
terrorism studies were based on small-n qualitative case studies (Sheehan, 2012), the number of 
quantitative studies in more recent literature has been increasing. For example, Silke (2008) 
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states that the use of open source data to quantitatively study terrorism has more than doubled 
since 9/11. While just over three percent of terrorism studies published between 1995 and 1999 
used inferential analysis, it increased to 10 percent after 9/11 (Silke, 2008). Morris and LaFree 
(2016) state that the growing interest in terrorism and the increasing availability of open source 
terrorism databases led to a rapid increase in the number of quantitative studies of country-level 
correlates of terrorism. Three of the most frequently used terrorism databases are the RAND 
Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), the International Terrorism: Attributes 
of Terrorist Events dataset (ITERATE), and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). 
2.4 Terrorism Databases: RDWTI, ITERATE, and GTD 
RAND Corporation began collecting data on international terrorist attacks in 1972. Their 
records on international terrorism date back to 1968. In 2001, after significant increases in 
funding and support received from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 
(MIPT), RAND started collecting data on domestic terrorism dating back to 1998. Funding for 
the RAND-MIPT data collection ended in 2008; however, RAND received additional support to 
expand the original dataset. RAND`s Database of World Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI)  contains 
approximately 36,000 domestic and international incidents for the period of 1968 and 2008 
(Sheehan, 2012). RDWTI database defines terrorism as:  
...violence calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm to coerce others into 
actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. 
Acts of terrorism are generally directed against civilian targets. The motives of all 
terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will 
achieve maximum publicity (Sheehan, 2012, p. 36). 
 
ITERATE is the most frequently used terrorism dataset (LaFree et al., 2015). It was 
originally collected by the former CIA analyst Edward Mickolus but is now updated by Todd 
Sandler and his colleagues (Sheehan, 2012). Like RDWTI, ITERATE`s records go back to 1968. 
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However, it is limited to international terrorist events (Sheehan, 2012). ITERATE contains 
approximately 13,000 transnational terrorist attacks that occurred between 1968 and 2009 
(Sheehan, 2012). Also, ITERATE provides qualitative descriptions of terrorist incidents (LaFree 
et al., 2015). The ITERATE database defines terrorism as: 
… the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political 
purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established 
governmental authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and 
behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims (Sheehan, 2012, p. 36). 
 
 The GTD was originally collected by Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service (PGIS). PGIS 
began collecting data in 1970 and, unlike other open source databases, the GTD is distinct from 
the other data sources because it contains both domestic and international attacks. The GTD 
defines terrorism as:  
the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by non-state actors to attain a 
political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” 
(LaFree et al., 2015, p. 13). 
 
 The GTD specifies that the act of violence or threat of violence must be intentional and 
must be conducted by a non-state actor. In addition, two of three following criteria must be met 
in order for the act to be included in the data: (1) pursuit of a political, economic, religious, or 
social goal; (2) intention to coerce or influence larger audiences; and (3) acts must not reflect 
legitimate warfare activities (Sheehan, 2012). 
 An important similarity between RAND, ITERATE, and GTD is that all focus on 
terrorist acts committed by non-state actors. They do not include terrorist acts of states. Other 
datasets, such as Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED), include state terrorism, 
unlike RAND, ITERATE, and GTD (Sheehan, 2012).  
 In conclusion, although there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, most 
definitions of terrorism emphasize the use or threat of violence and fear to obtain political, 
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economic, social or religious goals. Definitions and measurements of terrorism vary in terms of 
the actors that are conceptually defined as terrorists (state versus non-state actors) and whether 
domestic or international terrorist events are included in the data. Of all the existing open source 
terrorism databases, the GTD arguably contains the most comprehensive set of terrorism 
incidents at the country-level. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
Though there is no consensus on the causes of terrorism,  results from the growing body 
of quantitative studies of country-level terrorism have found that there are numerous factors 
related to the frequency of country-level terrorism (Sandler, 2014). These studies have used a 
wide variety of variables to predict country-level terrorism, generally speaking, most studies 
focus on the demographic, economic, and political correlates of country-level terrorism (Morris 
and LaFree, 2016). In the following section, I briefly review the major demographic, economic 
and political correlates of country-level terrorism. Although not the primary interest of this 
study, many of these variables are included as control variables and I provide a brief review of 
the existing findings. I then provide a detailed discussion of the theoretical rationale and 
empirical evidence for the relationship between state-based human rights violations and country-
level terrorism. 
3.1 Correlates of Country-Level Terrorism  
 There are several demographic correlates of country-level terrorism. Previous studies 
have included measures of population (Azam and Delacroix, 2006; Burgoon, 2006; Campos and 
Gassebner, 2013; Chenoweth, 2010; Danzell and Zidek, 2013), urbanization (Campos and 
Gassebner, 2013; Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011), and ethnic fractionalization (Abadie, 2006; 
Boehmer and Daube, 2013; Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011). Larger populations, as compared 
to smaller populations, may be more vulnerable to terrorist attacks because of the increased 
opportunity for terrorism present in larger populations. Additionally, countries with larger 
populations may have more difficulty monitoring larger populations and preventing terrorist 
mobilization; therefore, it could be easier for terrorists to hide themselves more effectively in 
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large populations (see Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011 and Morris and LaFree, 2016 for a 
review of correlates of country-level terrorism). 
Closely linked to arguments about population, urbanized areas tend to have larger 
populations than rural areas and because terrorists seek mass casualties, urban areas may be more 
attractive to terrorist attacks (Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011). Finally, there is also evidence 
that ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity in a country is also related to terrorism (Gassebner 
and Luechinger, 2011). Highly ethnic, linguistic, or religiously fragmented societies may be 
more likely to experience terrorism because of separatist or sectarian violence and due to the 
competition over scarce sources (Abadie, 2006; Basuchoudhary and Shughart, 2010; Gassebner 
and Luechinger, 2011).  
Studies which analyze the relationship between economic variables and terrorism 
generally focus on the effects of economic development and economic inequality. Many studies 
have examined the “rooted-in-poverty hypothesis” (Piazza, 2006, p. 160),  which states that 
terrorism is an expression and product of socio-economic discontent and desperation (Piazza, 
2006). Impoverished countries with low educational levels and high unemployment rates should 
be the most vulnerable to both producing and experiencing terrorism (Piazza, 2006). Among the 
most frequently studied economic variables are:  GDP (Azam and Thelen, 2008; Coggins, 2014; 
Dreher and Fischer, 2010; Enders and Hoover, 2012), income (Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana, 
2004), economic discrimination (Freytag, Krüger, Meierrieks, and Schneider, 2011; Piazza, 
2011), economic freedoms (Basuchoudhary and Shughart, 2010; Choi and Luo, 2013; Gassebner 
and Luechinger, 2011),  and foreign portfolio investment (Azam and Thelen, 2008; Azam and 
Delacroix, 2006; Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011).  
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  Finally, several studies have examined the effects of political variables on country-level 
terrorism, such as regime type (Boehmer and Daube, 2013; Bravo and Dias, 2006; Coggins, 
2014;(Blomberg et al., 2004; Savun and Phillips, 2009) components of democracy (Piazza, 
2007), regime durability (Coggins, 2014; Piazza, 2007, 2008), and various measures of state 
failure (Choi and Luo, 2013; Piazza, 2007, 2008). Perhaps the most often studied political 
correlate of terrorism is regime type, specifically, democratic versus autocratic regimes.  
 There are two schools of thought explaining the relationship between democracy and 
terrorism (Eyerman, 1988; Crenshaw, 1981). The political access school believes that democratic 
states provide multiple channels to express dissent without the threat of government retaliation 
and allows for change through non-violent means (Eyerman, 1998). Therefore, legal activities 
are preferred more than illegal or violent activities, such as terrorism (Eyerman, 1998). 
Conversely, the strategic school argues that democratic states may experience more terrorism 
because democratic states, as compared to more autocratic states, are more heavily committed to 
the protection of civil liberties (Eyerman, 1998). Because democracies, as compared to 
autocracies, allow more freedom of movement and association and easy access to public 
buildings, democratic states may be less able to prevent terrorist group mobilization and as a 
result more likely to experience terrorism  (Eyerman, 1998). There is empirical evidence 
supporting both political access and strategic schools.  
 For instance, while Eyerman (1998) found that democracies experience fewer terrorists 
attacks, Choi and Luo (2013) found that democratic states experience more terrorism than non-
democratic states. Others have also found that “new” democracies are more likely to experience 
terrorism. This indicates that regime durability, or the length of the current regime type, is also a 
significant predictor of terrorism. Regime durability may be related to increased terrorism in two 
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ways. First, new democracies, like established democracies, may be targeted by terrorists 
because the increased protection of civil liberties allows for increased terrorist group 
mobilization. Second, new democracies may experience more terrorism because they are not as 
effective as established democracies in providing avenues for political dissent (Piazza, 2007). In 
addition to regime type (democracy versus autocracy) and regime durability, several scholars 
have examined the relationship between democracy and terrorism by disaggregating democracy 
into specific components, such as the protection of civil liberties and political rights (Ehrlich and 
Liu, 2002; Piazza, 2007).  
 The most frequently studied components of democracy are protection of civil liberties 
(Piazza, 2007; Piazza, 2017), associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal 
autonomy/individual rights, political rights and political pluralism and participation, and 
functioning of government (Piazza, 2017). Piazza (2007) analyzed whether the protection of civil 
liberties is a significant predictor of terrorism and found that countries that protect civil liberties 
are more likely to experience international terrorism. However, Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen, and 
Klemmensen (2006) found that civil liberties is negatively correlated with terrorism. Countries 
that protect civil liberties experience less terrorism. In regards to political rights, Abadie (2006) 
found that lack of political freedoms increases terrorism. Similarly, Savun and Phillips (2009) 
found that political discrimination significantly increases terrorism at the country-level.  
Another important political variable to emerge from the literature is state failure. A 
number of studies have indicated state failure is related to terrorism (Morris and LaFree, 2016; 
Piazza, 2007). Scholars have argued that weak or failed states tend to have large numbers of 
terrorist groups and are more likely to be targeted by terrorists. Conceptually, the definition of 
state failure is very broad and, encompasses many conceptually distinct indicators of state failure 
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(Taylor, 2013). Indeed, Chomsky (2006) states that the concept of state failure is “frustratingly 
imprecise” (p.1). Nonetheless, Chomsky (2006) states that most definitions of state failure focus 
on states` inability or their unwillingness to protect their citizens. The existing literature has 
conceptualized and measured state inability to protect citizens in two ways (1) the loss of the 
monopoly of using force due to various conflicts and tensions (Piazza, 2008) and (2) the use of 
repressive and aggressive acts that violate domestic and international laws (Chomsky, 2006; 
Walsh and Piazza, 2010).  
In regards to losing the monopoly of using force, Piazza (2008) defines failed and failing 
states as entities that lack formal control over a geographic boundary in regards to non-state 
actors in society. Similarly, Taylor (2013) states that a failed state cannot impose order; it loses 
its physical control of territory and its monopoly over the legitimate use of force. One of the 
most frequently used measure of a state’s loss of monopoly of using force is collected by the 
Political Instability Task Force (PITF), which was previously referred as the State Failure Task 
Force. Commissioned by the former U.S. Vice President Al Gore in 1994, the PITF classifies 
state failure into four categories: (1) continuing military conflicts between insurgents and state in 
order to place a regime change (revolutionary wars), (2) civil wars, rebellions, sustained 
communal warfare based on separatist ideologies (ethnic wars), (3) sustained policies run by 
states or their agents that result in deaths of a high proportion of members of a community, such 
as ethnic or religious, groups or political dissenters (genocides and politicides), and (4) major, 
sudden shifts in patterns of governance, including state collapse (adverse regime change) (Esty et 
al., 1998). 
 The second conceptualization of state failure focuses on the state’s use of repressive and 
aggressive acts that violate domestic and international laws. Chomsky (2006) states that failed 
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states tend to regard themselves as beyond domestic and international law, and hence, feel free to 
engage in repression and violence on its citizens. In democratic regimes, such type of state 
failure results in serious “democratic deficit” (Chomsky, 2006, p.2) that prevents democratic 
institutions from functioning in their formal forms. Scholars analyzing state failure in the form of 
state repression generally use measures of state-based violations of human rights or physical 
integrity rights (Fahey and LaFree, 2015; Piazza, 2017; Piazza and Walsh, 2010; Walsh and 
Piazza, 2010). The Cingranelli and Richards` (2004) (CIRI) Human Rights database is one of the 
most used sources for measuring state violations of human rights. Violations of physical or 
personal integrity rights carried out by a state or its agents, include abuses such as extrajudicial 
killings, torture or similar physical abuses, disappearances, and political imprisonment (Wood 
and Gibney, 2010). Other databases of human rights violations include the U.S. State 
Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and Amnesty International reports. 
In the next section I discuss the theoretical rationale and empirical evidence for the 
relationship between state-based violations of human and physical integrity rights on country-
level terrorism. 
3.2 Theoretical Framing of State- Based Human Rights Violations and Terrorism 
There are two theoretical explanations that expect state-based violations of human rights 
to increase terrorist activity. State-based violations of human rights can lead to terrorism by 
closing peaceful avenues for dissent, and it can result in terrorism by fostering public alienation, 
grievances and terrorist group mobilization (Piazza, 2017).  
First, terrorism could be a defense mechanism against repressive governments in 
circumstances where the state closes peaceful avenues of dissents or in cases in which dissenters 
think that peaceful means would not produce any progress (DeNardo, 1985). Piazza (2017) 
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argues that closing down avenues for dissent through different repressive means such as the 
restriction of free speech or the right to strike or publicly protest, and press censorship of 
independent, critical and unauthorized political opinions, can accelerate the act of terrorism. 
Similarly, Crenshaw (1981) states that denial of access to power, persecution of dissenters, 
political imprisonment, and blocking legal expressions of the opposition by the country is more 
likely to induce terrorism.  
Piazza (2017) states that this theoretical approach makes use of the flip side of Eyerman’s 
(1998) “political access school”, which argues that non-violent, legal political activity is 
preferred over violence when it is believed that there will be a change in the governmental 
policy. Looking at the flip side of the “political access school,” if it is believed that peaceful 
means are not working anymore or that they will result in retaliation by the government, then 
repression becomes a motivation for dissenters to think that terrorism is a more efficient action 
compared to working within the system (Piazza, 2017).  
Second, it is assumed that the relationship between state oppression and terrorism is 
based on the overall climate of public approval of the government (Piazza, 2017). Piazza states 
that repression alienates citizens from their government and damages the legitimacy of the state. 
This, in turn, fosters anti-state and anti-status quo grievances. The environment created by 
repression becomes vulnerable to extremist movements in regard to the gathering of support, 
recruitment of new members, and distribution of effective propaganda. Moreover, other states 
are less likely to cooperate with repressive countries concerning intelligence-sharing and 
extraditing persons suspected of terrorism due to the violation of international laws (Piazza, 
2017). 
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 The second explanation of the relationship between state violations of human rights and 
terrorism is based on Gurr’s (1970) conceptual framework for grievance and rebellion. 
According to Gurr (1970), the assumption that the more a state imposes sanctions on dissidents, 
the less violence dissidents will do is often a self-defeating fallacy. Gurr (1970) argues that a 
regime`s response to a threat with greater force more likely results in an intensification of 
resistance. In recent work, Gurr (2015) states that one of the two main routes by which some 
members of a group accept extreme means is the "reaction" (p.173).  According to Gurr (2015), 
reaction is a process whereby members of a regional, communal, or political group use terrorism 
in response to threatened social change and intervention by authorities. If a group believes that 
their rights and status are threatened, the reaction occurs as a mean of defense, mostly in the 
form of terrorism. Piazza (2017) states that state repression against minorities, such as economic 
and political discrimination, and particular human rights abuses damage the relationship between 
states and citizens that, in turn, foster domestic and transnational political opposition.  
 The previously discussed theoretical explanations of the effects of state-based human 
rights violations and country-level terrorism all draw heavily from the political science literature. 
Criminological theories also provide theoretical explanations of the relationship. Two examples 
include Messner and Rosenfeld’s (2001) institutional anomie theory (IAT) and Sherman’s (1993) 
defiance theory.  
Messner  and Rosenfeld’s (2001) institutional anomie theory states that the level and type 
of country-level crime is predicted by a country’s institutional balance of power. Drawing from 
both Durkheim and Merton, they argue that institutional imbalance of power within a country 
can lead to widespread anomie and weakened social controls which then led to high crime.  
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They focus on the economic, family, educational, religious and political institutions. 
These institutions provide distinct although related functions. For example, the economic system 
provides for the physical and material needs of a country. The political institution provides and 
allows for collective goals of the people, and socialization and social control are often provided 
by family, educational, and religious institutions (Rosenfeld and Messner, 2006). Ideally, there 
should be a balance of power among all institutions. Imbalance occurs when one social 
institution dominates the others (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2001).  Institutional dominance 
weakens the ability of other social institutions to exercise social control as well as the ability to 
temper the stress that results from the dominant institution.  
The institutional imbalance of power from an overly dominant political system may 
weaken social control and eventually, result in higher levels of terrorist activity directed at the 
country. Studies examining economic institutional dominance and crime have provided some 
partial support for the theory (Chamlin and Cochran, 1995; Maume and Lee, 2003; Messner and 
Rosenfeld, 1997; Pratt and Godsey, 2003; Savolainen, 2000; Stucky, 2003; Cullen, Parboteeah, 
and Hoegl, 2004; Piquero and Piquero, 1998).  
Although this dissertation is only focused on macro-level differences in terrorism and 
thus relies more heavily on macro-level theoretical frameworks, one micro-level theory that can 
explain how state-based violations may lead individuals to engage in terrorism is Defiance 
theory (1993). Sherman’s (1993) defiance theory may also explain why state-based human rights 
violations may lead to increased radicalization, mobilization and subsequent terrorist activity. 
Sherman (1993) states that a sanction is considered unfair when it is discriminatory, excessive, 
undeserved, and substantively arbitrary or when the agent behaves with disrespect for the 
offender. In such circumstances where people are treated with excessive or discriminatory 
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sanctions or where state agents are disrespectful to people`s rights, defiance is more likely to 
occur. Sherman (1993) describes defiance as “the net increase in the prevalence, incidence, or 
seriousness of future offending against a sanctioning community caused by a proud, shameless 
reaction to administration of a criminal sanction” (p.459). Specifically, Sherman (1993) states 
that defiance occurs under the four following conditions, all of which are necessary:  
1.! The offender defines a criminal sanction as unfair. 
2.! The offender is poorly bonded to or alienated from the sanctioning agent of the 
community the agent represents. 
3.! The offender defines the sanction as stigmatizing and rejecting a person, not a law-
breaking act. 
4.! The offender denies or refuses to acknowledge the shame the sanction has actually 
caused him to suffer (p.460).  
 
Theoretically, state-based human rights violations can be viewed as unfair and increase 
the probability of defiance in the form of radicalization and subsequent terrorist activity. 
Sanctions that are viewed as repressive or unfair may encourage political dissenters to resort to 
more serious and radical means.  
3.3 Empirical Review 
 The theoretical connection between state violations of human rights and terrorism has 
been discussed above. In this section, I will discuss the results from several country-level studies 
that analyze the relationship between state-based violations of human rights and terrorism. While 
there are numerous indicators of state failure, I will restrict my empirical review to those studies 
that measure state-failure as state-based violations of human or physical integrity rights by states 
and to those studies that examine country-level targets of terrorism.  
Walsh and Piazza (2010) examined if countries with greater protection of human rights 
have a lower incidence of terrorism. In their analysis, they used a sample of 195 countries over a 
multiyear period (1981-2004) to test examine if government violations of physical integrity 
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rights promotes terrorism at the country-level.  They used two of the most frequently used 
terrorism datasets, ITERATE and RAND-MIPT. Because ITERATE included information only 
on transnational attacks, they used RAND-MIPT to gather data on domestic attacks and 
transnational attacks. They used the Cingranelli and Richards` (2004) (CIRI) Human Rights 
dataset to measure physical integrity rights, which is measured as the extent to which the 
government engages in disappearances, extrajudicial killings, holding political prisoners, and 
torture. They also included measures of democracy (Polity IV), government involvement in an 
international war, government engagement in a civil war, and the natural log of the state’s 
population. They ran four models on four different terrorism outcomes: (1) the number of 
domestic attacks (MIPT), (2) the number of transnational attacks (MIPT), (3) the total number of 
terrorist attacks (MIPT), and (4) the number of transnational attacks (ITERATE).   
Results indicated that greater protection of physical integrity rights is negatively related 
to the number of terrorist attacks regardless of the type of terrorism (Walsh and Piazza, 2010). In 
other words, greater protection of physical integrity rights reduces the number of both domestic 
terrorism and transnational terrorism (Walsh and Piazza, 2010). In terms of the magnitude of the 
effect, they found that one-unit increase in the protection of physical integrity rights from the 
lowest level of 0 to 1 reduces the expected number of terrorist attacks by between 17 and 40 
percent.   
 One problematic issue, however, is whether the relationship between repression of 
physical integrity rights and terrorism is endogenous or not. Some scholars argue that although 
suppression of physical integrity rights leads to more terrorism, it is also possible that terrorist 
attacks lead governments to repress physical integrity rights (Walsh and Piazza, 2010). However, 
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Piazza and Walsh (2009) examined this issue and found that terrorist attacks were not 
significantly related to subsequent repression of physical integrity rights.  
Piazza and Walsh (2010), in another study, examined the separate effects of their 
physical integrity composite measure on both domestic and international terrorism. Piazza and 
Walsh (2010) tested whether (1) torture, (2) political incarceration without due process, (3) 
disappearances suspected to result from the workings of state agents, and (4) extrajudicial 
killings perpetrated by government officials are significantly related to terrorism. Using data 
from GTD and ITERATE, they analyzed country-year data for 142 countries for the period of 
1981 to 2004. Results indicated that protection of physical integrity rights is associated with 
fewer terrorist attacks. When physical integrity rights were disaggregated into the four 
components, they reported that states that avoid political imprisonment of citizens, extrajudicial 
killings, and disappearances experience less domestic and international terrorism. However, the 
relationship between torture and terrorism was not significant. Improvement in protection of 
rights against extrajudicial murders and political imprisonment led to the most dramatic decrease 
in terrorist attacks, compared to improvements in torture and disappearances. Piazza and Walsh 
(2010) state that this is because violations like extrajudicial killings and political imprisonment 
are highly overt, making them practical tools for terrorist movements to propagandize. 
In another study, Piazza (2017) further examined how different types of state repression 
impact terrorist attacks. Piazza (2017) examined nine various types of state oppression: physical 
integrity rights abuse, restriction of movement, restriction of association, restriction of electoral 
self-determination, press censorship, restriction of free speech, labor repression, religious 
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repression, and minority discrimination.2 Some of these measures, such as restriction of free 
speech and association, and restriction of electoral self-determination, overlap with restrictions in 
political rights or civil liberties that have been used as control variables in other studies. The 
physical integrity rights measure includes protections against physical torture, political 
imprisonment, extrajudicial killing, or disappearance. Using data from the GTD, Piazza (2017) 
analyzed annual domestic terrorism in 149 countries between 1981 and 2006. Piazza (2017) 
tested two hypotheses. First, Piazza (2017) tested whether closing peaceful avenues for dissent 
increase terrorism. Second, Piazza (2017) examined whether acts of state repression that provoke 
group grievances increase terrorism.  
His results indicated that types of state repression which provoke group grievances, such 
as religious repression, minority discrimination, and abuse of physical integrity rights, are all 
significant predictors of terrorist attacks. Regarding the closure of peaceful avenues, only 
restriction of electoral self-determination and labor repression slightly increased the incidence of 
terrorism. In addition, countries, with low levels of abuse of physical integrity rights and 
minority discrimination, are significantly less likely to experience terrorism (Piazza, 2017). For 
example, a one-unit increase in the abuse of physical integrity rights score increases terrorism by 
10.1 percent. Piazza (2017) concludes that state repression overall is a stimulant, rather than a 
suppressor, of domestic terrorism.  
Daxecker (2015) specifically focused on the effects of just one form of physical integrity 
rights abuse, torture, on terrorism. She argues that use of harsh repression by a government can 
intensify the incidence and duration of terrorism. Daxecker (2015) states that there are two 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!The data were gathered from the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data (2010), 
Freedom House Index of Press Censorship (2012) and Minorities at Risk (2009) database.!
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different torture types, scarring torture and stealth torture. Scarring torture is described as the 
form of torture which is visible and less deniable by governments (e.g., acts that leave visible 
marks on the body and includes whipping, beating, kicking, etc.). Conversely, stealth torture is 
defined as the kind of torture which is less visible and has greater deniability (e.g., acts that do 
not leave visible marks on the body and includes sleep deprivation, hypothermia, etc.). Although 
both scarring and stealth torture of detainees may have the same impact within a group that has 
already used terrorism, she argues that the impact of these two types of torture varies in larger 
environments. Daxecker (2015) states that dissemination of information about scarring torture 
can spread faster than stealth torture with less ambiguity and less deniability by the government. 
As a result, countries where torture is prevalent become the sources of terrorism and people who 
use peaceful means of resistance may be more likely radicalized which, in turn, leads to an 
increased number of terrorist activity. Within this perspective, she hypothesizes that a higher 
incidence of scarring torture is expected to result in an increase in the number of terrorist 
incidents in countries.   
Using data from GTD for the period of 1995 to 2005, Daxecker (2015) used negative 
binomial regression to examine the relationship between torture and terrorism. For the primary 
independent variable, she used data from the Ill-Treatment and Torture Specific Allegations (ITT 
SA) dataset. 3 The data quantify all torture allegations from 1995 to 2005 and categorizes the 
allegations by torture technique. She created two variables, the count of scarring torture and the 
count of stealth torture. Scarring and stealth torture allegations range from 0 to 125 and 0 to 70, 
respectively.  In addition to the main independent variables, she included seven control variables: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 By using Amnesty International documents, the Ill-Treatment and Torture Allegations project 
codes data on four concepts: (1) incidence, (2) perpetrators, (3) motive, and (4) judicial response. !
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GDP per capita, population size, human right violations, durability of regime, lagged moving 
average of the dependent variable, spatial lag of terrorism, and dummy variables that account for 
increases and decreases in the incidence of terrorism resulting from unobserved factors. 
Daxecker`s (2015) results indicated that scarring torture is significantly and positively 
correlated with country-level terrorism and that greater numbers of scarring allegations increase 
the probability of terrorist events. When scarring torture moves from 0 to 5, the expected number 
of terrorist incidents increased from 2.3 to 9 (Daxecker, 2015). The coefficient of stealth torture 
was negative but not statistically significant. 
In another study, Mullins and Young (2010) examined how general levels of violence 
within a given society (culture of violence) influence the probability of terrorism. Mullins and 
Young (2010) argue that each country has a different level of acceptance for violence (culture of 
violence) and this acceptance of violence is an important force that produces terrorism. If a 
society has high cultural tolerance of violence, it is more likely that terrorism becomes a form of 
dissent expression. Similarly, if the state uses violence to solve difficulties, dissidents are more 
likely to resort terrorism (Mullins and Young, 2012). They hypothesized that states which 
experienced state-organized and supported violence will have higher rates of terrorism than 
countries that do not use such violence. 
Mullins and Young (2012) analyzed 174 countries between 1970 to 1997. Using data 
from the GTD and Amnesty International, Mullins and Young (2012) analyzed the association 
between fatal terror events and state-based violations of human rights. Their results indicated that 
state-based violations of human rights are significantly and positively correlated with terrorism. 
A one-unit increase in state-based violations of human rights increases the probability of being in 
the group of countries that has at least one fatal terror attack by more than 93% (Mullins and 
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Young, 2012). Furthermore, a one-unit increase in the violations of human rights increases the 
expected count of terror events by 128% (Mullins and Young, 2012).  
 In sum, there is considerable empirical evidence that indicates a significant relationship 
between state-based violations of human rights and country-level terrorism. Both the composite 
measure of state-based violations of human rights and various components of it, such as 
extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and political imprisonment, significantly increased the 
incidence of terrorism at the country-level.  However, with the exception of a few studies 
(Daxecker, 2017; Fahey and LaFree, 2017), many existing studies have not examined the within-
country and between-country effects of state-based human rights violations over time. Rather, 
most studies have examined only between-country effects, or have used analytical approaches 
that estimates both within and between-country level variation.  One major advantage of 
longitudinal data across multiple units is the ability to disentangle between-unit and within-unit 
effects on the outcome, yet most studies of country-level terrorism have not examined within-
country effects of correlates on country-level terrorism. The primary benefit of examining the 
effects of within-country changes in state-based human rights violations on within-country 
changes in country-level terrorism is the ability to make stronger casual inferences.  The current 
study seeks to expand upon the current research on state-based human rights violations and 
country-level terrorism by using more recent data, and by examining the effects of within-
country changes in state-based human rights violations on within-country changes in terrorism.   
 
 
 
 
   
! 30 
Chapter 4 
Data and Methodology 
In this chapter, I discuss the hypotheses, the methodology and analytical approach for the 
current study. I begin with the hypotheses of the current study, followed by a description of the 
sample and a detailed discussion of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)—the primary data 
source for the outcome variables. I also discuss the primary predictor variable, state-based 
human rights violations, that is taken from the Amnesty International database, as well as all 
other control variables included in the study. Finally, I discuss the analytic strategy used in the 
current study.  
4.1 Hypotheses 
I investigate two hypotheses using three separate outcome measures of terrorism. Based 
on existing theory and empirical evidence, I have the following research hypotheses:  
 
H1: Within-country changes in state-based human rights violations are significantly 
related to within-country changes in total, fatal and attributed terrorism events over time, 
controlling for other socio-political and demographic variables. Thus, countries that 
experience increases in state-based human rights violations will also experience increases 
in all terrorism outcomes.  
  
H2: Between-country differences in the level of state-based human rights violations are 
related to increased total, fatal and attributed terrorism events over time, controlling for 
other socio-political and demographic variables. Thus, countries with higher levels of 
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state-based human rights violations, as compared to other countries with lower levels, are 
more likely to experience annual increases in all types of terrorism outcomes. 
 4.2 Unit of Analysis and Sample 
The unit of analysis is the country-year. I use cross-national time-series data for 175 
countries between 1980 and 2014.  There are a total of 5,950 country-year observations (See 
Table 1 in the Appendix A for a list of countries and valid country-year observations). 
It is important to note that the political circumstances of many countries have resulted in 
geographic boundary changes over time over time. For example, many countries have achieved 
independence from larger countries during the time span. Conversely, other countries have 
unified over time. For example, Czechoslovakia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
and Yugoslavia dissolved into other separate independent countries.4 To take these changes into 
account, countries have valid data only during time points in which they were officially 
independent from former countries.  
4.3 The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
The GTD was originally collected by Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service (PGIS). PGIS 
began gathering information on both domestic and international terrorist attacks in 1970 and 
PGIS data collection ended in 1997. PGIS used the following sources: wire services (e.g., 
Reuters and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS]), US State Department reports 
and other US and foreign government reports, and several US and international newspapers (e.g.,  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4!Czechoslovakia separated into Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993. Russia, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan emerged as new states after the breakup of 
the USSR in 1991. Croatia and Macedonia gained independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia in 1992, and Kosovo in 1999. Yugoslavia became Serbia-
Montenegro in 2003 and they separated into two nation states in 2006. In addition, West and East 
Germany unified in 1990 as Germany and Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993.!
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the New York Times, the Washington Post, the British Financial Times, the Times of India, 
Turkey’s Milliyet, and the Spanish-language Diario Las Americas) (LaFree et al., 2015).5 In 
2001, the original hard copies of the PGIS terrorism database were acquired by researchers at the 
University of Maryland and in 2006 the University of Maryland, in collaboration with several 
other agencies and universities across the nation, extended the data collection beyond 1997.6  
The original PGIS data was digitized, updated, and expanded by University of Maryland 
researchers by actively searching ITERATE, RDWTI, Worldwide Incidents Tracking System 
(WITS), specialized reports, UN reports, regional and national reports, and governmental reports. 
The updated version is referred to as the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD is 
currently updated and maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START).   
To collect data on terrorism, the GTD team at START combines automated and manual 
data collection strategies to maximize efficiency. Initially, the team identifies a small subset of 
articles related to terrorist attacks among over one million media articles published daily 
worldwide (LaFree et al., 2015). These are processed by applying customized keyword filters 
achieved via subscription to the Metabase Application Programming Interface (API) provided by 
Moreover Technologies, Inc. The program is supplemented with articles downloaded from the 
Open Source Center, which provides English-language translations of sources from over 160 
countries in over 80 languages. After creation of a subset of articles, the GTD team manually 
reviews them based on GTD inclusion criteria and applies the relevant coding criteria. The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5!In the 1990s, the internet became the major source of information for PGIS.!
6!During the transfer process, it was discovered that one box of data, containing records from 
1993, had been lost by PGIS in an earlier office move and was never fully recovered!
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amount of articles reviewed for this purpose is about 16,000 per month (National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2015; LaFree et al., 2015). 
The GTD includes a set of criteria and requires all three of the following attributes to be 
present for an event to be considered a terrorist attack:  
1)! “The incident must be intentional- the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a 
perpetrator.” 
2)! “The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence- 
including property violence, as well as violence against people.” 
3)! “The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. The database does not 
include acts of state terrorism” (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism, 2015, p. 8).  
 
While the GTD requires all three of these attributes to be present, it also requires at least 
two of the following three criteria to be present for an incident to be included in the GTD. These 
are: 
1)! “The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. In 
terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must 
involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.” 
2)! “There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey some other 
message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.” 
3)! “The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. That is, the act 
must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the 
prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants)” (National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2015, p.8).  
 
It is important to note that the GTD only counts the targets of terrorism not the source of 
terrorism. If a specific country matched with a specific incident, it indicates the country is the 
target of the terrorist attack.  
4.4 Outcome Variables 
The GTD is an incident level database. The data includes each identified terrorist incident 
and incident specific information such as the geographic location and date of the attack, the 
entity targeted by the attack, and the number of perpetrators and victims (see LaFree, Dugan and 
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Miller 2015 for a complete review of all information included in the GTD). I created a country-
year database by aggregating annual counts of three types of terrorist incidents to the country-
year level. The outcome variables used in this study include: (1) total attacks, (2) attacks with 
which a particular group is associated (attributed attacks), and (3) attacks that resulted in at least 
one fatality (fatal attacks).  
Total attacks measure the number of all attacks recorded for each country-year. There are 
a total of 131,486 terrorist attacks for the 175 countries in the GTD (see Table 1). I also use two 
other related measures of terrorism. I use a measure of terrorism, “attributed attacks,” that only 
counts those events the GTD team has assessed as “no doubt as to whether the incident is an act 
of terrorism.” 7  There are 99,126 attributed attacks. I also use a measure of terrorism that only 
includes fatal attacks, which includes all attacks that resulted in at least one fatality. As 
compared to total and attributed attacks, there are fewer fatal attacks during the 34-year time 
period (59,878) (See Table 1 for descriptive statistics for all three outcomes variables and Table 
1 in the Appendix A for a list of all variables, coding scheme and data source).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7!The GTD includes a variable, “doubtterr,” that indicates whether there is doubt that the incident 
is an act of terrorism or not. If the incident has been coded as “0”, it shows that there is no doubt 
at all that the incident is an act of terrorism.!This variable is only available after 1997.!
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Variables 
 Total Attacks Fatal Attacks Attributed Attacks 
Sum 131,486 59,878 99,126 
Mean 23.83 10.86 17.96 
Variance 14358.492 4729.146 10059.090 
Valid Observations 5518 5514 5518 
Zero Counts (N) 2677 3520 2938 
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4.5 The Advantages of the GTD 
The GTD has three main advantages that are useful for this study. First, and perhaps the 
most significant strength, the GTD contains data for both domestic and international terrorism 
incidents since 1970 (LaFree et al., 2015). Second, according to LaFree et al. (2015), the GTD is 
the most comprehensive unclassified terrorism database in the world. It currently includes 
information on over 140,000 terrorist attacks. Details about the GTD illustrate that it includes 
information on more than 58,000 bombings, 15,000 assassinations, and 6,000 kidnappings since 
1970. For each case, the GTD has incident-level information on at least 45 variables, reaching 
over 120 variables for more recent incidents. From 1998 to 2014, over 4,000,000 news articles 
and 25,000 news sources were reviewed to collect data (National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2015). Finally, the structure of the database and its 
detailed information on each case allows researchers to customize the dataset into different 
subsets.  
4.6 The Disadvantages of the GTD 
 Despite current changes and improvement over time, the GTD data also has limitations. 
First, because terrorism has overlapping characteristics with other types of crime and violence, it 
can be difficult to distinguish terrorism from other types of violence, such as genocide, 
insurrection, insurgency, massive civil unrest or even homicide. This is especially so when 
identifying acts of terrorism in armed conflicts, such as those that occurred in Iraq following the 
US-led invasion in 2003 or Syria following the violent clashes started in 2011 (LaFree et al., 
2015). Moreover, acts of terrorism sometimes have similarities with hate crime or organized 
crime in regards to intimidation, coercion, and messaging  (LaFree et al., 2015).  
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Second, sometimes, there is a lack of detailed information on essential elements of 
terrorist attacks. In many cases, the news sources cannot provide specific details about the 
perpetrator. In these cases, the perpetrator is unknown or the act it’s attributed to a broader 
ideology or movement, such as ‘right-wing extremists'. Thus, most of the open source databases, 
including the GTD, face limitations in regards to the information on the characteristics and 
careers of terrorist organizations or members of terrorist movements (LaFree et al., 2015). This 
limitation results in missing data for studies of terrorism focused on terrorist groups or terrorist 
group mobilization. 
Finally, the desire and tendency to develop time series to analyze terrorist attacks 
longitudinally require continual updating of event databases without lapses. However, most 
event databases are faced with time lapses due to the lack of funding or lack of high-quality data 
collection efforts. Even though the GTD is fortunate to have received a good deal of government 
funding and implemented several quality-control tactics, the GTD is also vulnerable to 
measurement error. For instance, while PGIS ended data collection in 1997, it was not until 2006 
when the original PGIS data was digitized and new funding for updates was secured. There was 
an eight-year time lapse between real events and data collection. This inevitably results in 
inconsistent data collection over time. For those eight years, a retrospective data collection was 
applied and it continued as prospective data collection after this point. Because newspapers and 
electronic media do not archive every news event, underreporting or missing data occurs in 
retrospective data collection (LaFree et al., 2015).  
4.7 Independent Variable of Interest: State-based Human Rights Violations 
 My measure of state-based violations of human rights is taken from the Amnesty 
International. In the early 1980s, Michael Stohl and several graduate students at Purdue 
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University used Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department Country Reports on 
Human Rights reports to create two measures of state-based violations of human rights, which 
they label the Political Terror Scale (PTS). They used criteria obtained from Freedom House to 
measure state-based violations of human rights. The PTS variable measures violations of human, 
physical or personal integrity rights carried out by a state or its agents. This includes extrajudicial 
killing, torture or similar physical abuse, disappearances, and political imprisonment (Wood and 
Gibney, 2010). The PTS originally included information for 59 countries between 1976 and 
1983. Over time, the PTS has expanded its coverage to more than 180 countries and now 
provides data on states’ human rights practices from 1976 to date.  
There are three different PTS measures generated from 3 different sources: Amnesty 
International (AI), the U.S. State Department, and more recently, Human Rights Watch (HRW). 
Amnesty International has data for 192 countries between 1976 and 2016, and the State 
department contains data for 210 countries between 1976 and 2016. The Human Rights Watch is 
a more recent data collection effort, starting in 2013, and has coverage for 208 countries. 
Amnesty International and the State Department provide the most comprehensive data given the 
time span of the current study. Although the State Department has more valid country-year 
observations (78.6%) than Amnesty International’s data (63.4%), I use data from the AI for two 
reasons. First, a measure of state-based terrorism generated by a non-government based 
organization, such as Amnesty International, may be perceived as less biased and more objective 
than measures generated by the U.S. State Department. Second, the AI data contained more 
comprehensive data for countries that allowed them to be included in the analysis. For example, 
the State Department data did not have any valid observations for the United States between 
1980 and 2015. In spite of the difference in data coverage between the two sources, the AI and 
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State Department scores are highly correlated with each other (r = 0.80, p <0.0001). The PTS 
measure ranges from one (1) to five (5), with higher values indicating more state-based human 
rights violations. The PTS coding is as follows:  
“Level 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, 
and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.” 
“Level 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. 
However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political 
murder is rare.” 
"Level 3: There is extensive political imprisonment or a recent history of such 
imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. 
Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted." 
“Level 4: Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of 
population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite 
of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics 
or ideas.”  
“Level 5: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies 
place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or 
ideological goals” (Wood and Gibney, 2010, p. 373). 
 
The PTS measures three dimensions of state-abuse: scope, intensity, and range (Wood 
and Gibney, 2010). Scope refers to the type of abuse that a state carries out, such as torture and 
political incarceration. Intensity refers to the frequency of abuse, such as the number of instances 
in a given period, and range refers to the portion of the population targeted for abuse (Wood and 
Gibney, 2010). Within these three dimensions, it is important to note that a state which extends 
violence to the entire population (range) and another state which applies gross and systematic 
abuse on a small subset of the entire population (intensity) may get the same score (Wood and 
Gibney, 2010).  
 One critique of the PTS points to the potentially subjective nature of the coding process. 
Wood and Gibney (2010) state that the contextual factors found in the reports prevent the 
generation of objective coding criteria (Wood and Gibney, 2010). To limit the potential for 
subjective coding, specific instructions are provided to the coders. For instance, coders are 
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instructed to keep their perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and biases of a country out of their work 
and specifically focus on the information provided in the country report. Furthermore, at least 
two coders read the reports and code each country for each year. After each person codes 
separately, the scores are then compared for inter-coder reliability. In approximately 80% of the 
cases, the coders give the same score. Where scores are different, an informal discussion 
between several coders is held to clarify the discrepancies between scores (Gibney, Cornett, 
Wood, Haschke, and Arnon, 2015). 
Another limitation of the PTS is that it does not disaggregate the overall state abuse 
measure into specific types of human rights violation. While the same score for two countries 
indicates that the violations in those countries are roughly the same, there may be variation in 
particular types of state abuse (Wood and Gibney, 2010). In other words, two countries with the 
same score may have variations in scope, intensity, and range of torture, extrajudicial killings, 
and political incarceration. While the PTS creators agree that it is beneficial to disaggregate state 
violations of human rights, they also state that the aggregated score is also a strength of the PTS. 
First, they do not accept the logic of summing every kind of state violation by giving the same 
value to each to determine the overall state score. For example, they do not believe that all acts 
of state violations are equivalent. The PTS does not accept the assumption that an act of torture is 
equivalent to a disappearance or that an extrajudicial killing is equivalent to a political 
imprisonment (Wood and Gibney, 2010). Furthermore, they do not believe that state abuse is 
linear. Unlike the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project (CIRI), which is another 
frequently used human rights index, the PTS rejects this assumed progression which claims that 
states proceed through abuse in a general sequence, starting from political imprisonment and 
continuing through torture, killing, and disappearance, respectively (Wood and Gibney, 2010). 
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Third, another problem regarding the disaggregation of human rights violations is that it is 
difficult to obtain accurate numbers of the prevalence of each violation (Wood and Gibney, 
2010). It is almost impossible to find an official report which provide the exact numbers of 
human rights violations occurred in that country. As a result, neither the Amnesty International 
or the State Department Country Reports on Human Right Practices state an exact number of 
incidents (Wood and Gibney, 2010). Thus, Wood and Gibney (2010) argue that measuring the 
levels of human rights violations is not an exact science, and efforts to measure such violations 
could be misleading. 
4.8 Control Variables  
 To guard against omitted variable bias and potential spuriousness, I include control 
variables that were previously found to be correlated with both terrorism and state violation of 
human rights. It is important to include control variables, because exclusion of such variables (if 
associated with both terrorism and independent variables), will provide biased regression 
estimates (Long, 1997). To prevent such potential bias, I include several demographic, 
economic, and political variables which are collected from different data sources. In the next 
sections, I discuss the data sources used to collect the control variables included in this study. 
 I include annual country-level measures of several demographic variables, including 
population and urbanization, provided by the World Bank.8 Prior research has indicated that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 The World Bank collects development indicator data from officially-recognized international 
sources. It is the most current and accurate global time-series data available and provides data on 
national, regional, and global estimates. Its coverage starts in1960 and is updated quarterly in 
April, July, September, and December. The topics covered by the World Bank: World 
Development Indicators are agriculture and rural development, aid effectiveness, climate change, 
economy and growth, education, energy and mining, environment, external debt, financial sector, 
gender, health, infrastructure, labor and social protection, poverty, private sector, public sector, 
science and technology, social development, trade, and urban development.  !
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countries with larger populations are at greater risk of being both a source and target of terrorism 
(Piazza, 2006; Kruger and Laitin, 2008; Campos and Gassebner, 2013; Choi and Lu, 2013; 
Danzell and Zideck, 2013; Young and Dugan, 2011; Piazza and Walsh, 2010; Morris and 
LaFree, 2016). Population is the sum of all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship 
excluding refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum. Research has also indicated 
that urban areas, both at the country and county-levels, are also more likely to be targets of 
terrorism (Tavares, 2004; Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Danzell and Zideck, 2013; LaFree 
and Bersani, 2014; Fahey and LaFree, 2015; Morris and LaFree, 2016). Urbanization is 
measured as the percentage of people living in urban areas within a country.  
In a series of supplemental analyses, I also include the variables sex ratio and ethnic 
fractionalization. Both variables had significant missing country-year data (see Table 2) as 
compared to the other variables used in the study. For example, of the 5,950 total country-year 
observations available, 38% and 44% of the country-year observations were missing for the 
variables sex ratio and ethnic fractionalization. As a result, I do not include these variables in the 
main analyses to retain the largest sample size possible and I examine the effects of these 
variables in a smaller subset of the sample. Sex ratio refers to male births per female births. The 
data are 5 year averages, thus there is substantial missing country-year data for this variable. I 
also use ethnic fractionalization data on 822 ethnic groups for 160 countries in the early 1990s 
(Fearon, 2003).9 Fearon’s ethnic fractionalization data (2003) includes data on ethnic groups that 
made up at least 1 percent of the country population. Ethnic fractionalization is defined as the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Fearon (2003) used Atlas Narodov Mira data to develop their ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
(ELF) index. In addition, Fearon (2003) completed the missing country-year cases based on their 
research mostly using the CIA Factbook, Encyclopedia Britannica, and the Library of Congress 
Country Studies. !
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probability two randomly drawn individuals in a country belong to different ethnolinguistic 
groups. Although the existing research on the effects of ethnic fractionalization on terrorism is 
mixed (Abadie, 2006; Baschoudhary and Schugart, 2010), and not nearly as common as studies 
including measures of economic development, some studies have found that ethnic tension, 
ethno-religious diversity, linguistic diversity and the number of ethnic groups was positively 
related to the location of country-level attacks using data taken from the GTD (Tavares, 2004; 
Piazza, 2006; Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Boehmer and Daube, 2013). 
To capture the effects of overall economic development and economic growth, I include 
measures of GDP per capita and GDP growth rate provided by the World Bank.10 GDP per 
capita is a country’s gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP growth rate 
measures a country’s annual increase in the percentage of GDP at market prices based on 
constant local currency. Several studies (Abadie, 2006; Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; 
Gelfand, LaFree, Fahey, and Feinberg, 2013; Piazza, 2006) have noted mixed effects of GDP on 
the incidence of terrorism at the country-level. For example, whereas some studies have found 
the country-level GDP increases the frequency of being a terrorism target (Blomberg et al., 2004; 
Kruger and Laitin, 2008; Piazza, 2011), others have found negative (Freytag et al., 2011; Li and 
Schaub, 2004) or null effects (Piazza, 2006; Abadie, 2006) of economic development on 
terrorism  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 The World Bank collects development indicator data from officially-recognized international 
sources. It is the most current and accurate global time-series data available and provides data on 
national, regional, and global estimates. Its coverage starts in1960 and is updated quarterly in 
April, July, September, and December. The topics covered by the World Bank: World 
Development Indicators are agriculture and rural development, aid effectiveness, climate change, 
economy and growth, education, energy and mining, environment, external debt, financial sector, 
gender, health, infrastructure, labor and social protection, poverty, private sector, public sector, 
science and technology, social development, trade, and urban development.  !
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Prior research has also indicated that a country’s political system or components of the 
political system are related to terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Liu, 2002; Freytag et al., 2011; Morris 
and LaFree, 2016). I include several variables that reflect the overall regime type and regime 
length from the Polity IV database.11 The democracy variable ranges from -10 to 10, in which -
10 equals “strongly autocratic” and 10 equals “strongly democratic.” The score is based on a 
number of indicators, including competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive 
recruitment, constraints of chief executive, and competitiveness of political participation. I also 
include regime durability which refers to the number of years since the most recent regime 
change or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions.  
The measure of regime type taken from Polity IV is an aggregate measure of democracy. I 
also include disaggregated measures of democracy that capture specific components of political 
systems. Using data from Freedom House,12 I include measures of state protection of civil 
liberties and political rights. Civil liberties range from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest 
protection and 7 representing lowest protection, and it is the annual score for each country based 
on freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and 
personal autonomy and individual rights. The variable political rights also ranges from 1 to 7, 
with 1 representing the highest protection and 7 representing the lowest protection, and it is the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11Initially collected under the direction of Ted Robert Gurr, the Polity IV project has been the 
most widely used resource for monitoring regime change and the impact of regime authority. It 
includes annual, cross-national, time-series, and polity-case data which codes democratic and 
autocratic patterns of authority and regime changes in all independent countries with total 
populations greater than 500,000 in 2014. It currently includes 167 countries. !
12!Founded in 1941, Freedom House was the first American organization to track the 
advancement of freedom and democracy globally. The organization analyzes the challenges to 
freedom and seeks for greater political rights and civil liberties.!!
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annual score for each country based on electoral process, political pluralism and participation, 
and functioning of government.  
Because there is substantial evidence indicating that state failure measured as state loss of 
monopoly of force due to various conflicts and tensions is related to increased country-level 
terrorism, I include data from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) (Fahey and LaFree, 
2015; Freytag et al., 2011; Piazza, 2008; Piazza, 2007; Lai, 2007).13 The PITF measures state 
involvement in ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, adverse regime change, and 
genocides/politicides. The state failure variable ranges from 0 (no state failure) and 17 (highly 
intense presence of state failure).14  
Finally, I also control for yearly variations by including year fixed effects, and I control for 
unmeasured between country-level differences by using country specific fixed effects.  
4.9 Analytical Strategy 
 The primary focus of this dissertation is to examine both within-country and between-
country effects of state-based human rights violations on annual changes in terrorism over time. 
In order to find the most appropriate statistical method for an analysis, the researcher should 
clearly identify the functional form of the outcome variable. I analyze counts outcomes for 175 
countries between 1980 and 2014 resulting in 5,950 country-year observations. Count outcomes 
are a subset of discrete responses and indicate the number of occurrences or counts of an event 
(Hilbe, 2011). Count outcomes should not be analyzed using linear regression models because 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13!Initially collected in 1994 by researchers at the Center for International Development and 
Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland under the direction of Ted Robert 
Gurr. Since August 2010, the Problem Set has been managed by Social-Systems Research Inc. !
14!Three of the events except genocides/politicides are scored from 0 to 4 indicating the average 
magnitude each failure. Genocides/Politicides is scored from 0 to 5 indicating the scaled number 
of deaths.!
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doing so violates some of the assumptions underlying the linear regression model (Long, 1997; 
Allison, 1999).   
 There are three categories of assumptions underlying the linear regression model. First, 
there must be no specification error in the following ways: (1a) the relationship between X and Y 
is linear, (1b) all relevant predictor variables have been included and (1c) all irrelevant predictors 
have been excluded (Lewis-Beck, 1980; Long, 1997). Second, (2a) there must be no 
measurement error (the variables X and Y are measured accurately).  Finally, there are a number 
of assumptions regarding the error term in a linear regression. The LRM assumes a (3a) zero 
conditional mean (the conditional expectation of the error term should be zero), (3b) 
homoscedasticity (the variance of the error terms is the same for all observations of X; errors 
have a constant variance) and no auto-correlation (the error terms are uncorrelated), and (3d) 
finally, the LRM assumes normality of the error terms and that the independent variable is 
uncorrelated with the error term (Lewis-Beck, 1980; Long, 1997). 
Count outcomes measured repeatedly over time violate many of the LRM assumptions. 
For example, LRM estimates using a non-continuous outcome violates the assumption of 
homoscedasticity and repeated measurements over time often involve correlated error terms. 
Although Long (1997) states that count variables are often treated as continuous variables, using 
LRM to analyze count outcomes results in inefficient, inconsistent, and biased estimates. There 
are several methods that are suitable for examining changes in count outcomes over time, 
including the Poisson and negative binomial regression models, with random and fixed effects 
(Allison, 2005).  
 
   
! 46 
4.9.1 Modeling Count Outcomes: Poisson Regression Models and Negative Binomial 
Regression Models 
The most basic count outcome model is the Poisson regression model (PRM) (Hilbe 
2011; Long, 1997; Allison, 2005). The main feature of PRM is that it treats the mean as equal to 
the variance (Hilbe, 2014). This means that as the mean of the distribution increases, the variance 
in the data increases (Hilbe, 2014). When the mean is equal to the variance, it is called equi-
dispersion (Long, 1997). However, the equi-dispersion criterion is often unrealistic and rarely 
satisfied when using real data. In practice, count variables often have a variance greater than the 
mean, which is called over dispersion (Long, 1997). The mean and variance of the outcomes 
(total attacks, fatal attacks, attributed attacks, and governmental attacks) and the number of zero 
scores for each outcome are displayed in Table 1. 
 The variances of all outcome variables are excessively higher than the mean values, this 
indicates that there is an over dispersion problem. Over dispersion can lead to underestimates of 
standard errors and over estimates of chi-square statistics, as well as inefficient estimates more 
generally (Allison 1999). Although Poisson models are able to correct for over dispersion by 
including a scale parameter that corrects the standard errors and chi-square estimates, the 
estimates are still considered inefficient.  An alternative modeling approach that provides 
efficient estimates and also accounts for over dispersion is the negative binomial regression 
model (NBRM) (Allison, 1999; 2005). 
 The negative binomial regression model (NBRM) is a generalization of the Poisson 
model and includes a modified disturbance term that accounts for over dispersion (Allison 1999). 
Unlike the PRM with over dispersion corrections, the NBRM separately models the conditional 
variance from the conditional mean to account for over dispersion (Hilbe, 2007). The NBRM 
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provides a much wider scope for variance than the PRM (Hilbe, 2014).  
4.10 Modeling Within-Country and Between-Country Effects on Annual Changes: 
Random and Fixed Effects Regression Models 
 Effects of Within-Country Changes in State-Based Human Rights Violations on Annual 
Changes in Terrorism 
According to Allison (2005), the fixed effects (FE) regression approach is one of the 
strongest methods for isolating causal effects in the absence of an experimental design. The fixed 
effects approach is designed to isolate and examine within-unit changes over time.  The FE 
approach only uses within-country variation in the estimation and discards any between-country 
variation.  Thus, each country serves as their own control since all comparisons are made within 
countries over repeated measurements. This results in one of the strongest benefits of the FE 
approach—the ability to control for time stable unobserved (unmeasured) differences between 
countries. Time stable unmeasured differences between countries can bias results, leading to 
what is termed “unobserved heterogeneity.” (Allison, 2005).  
The FE model controls for unobserved heterogeneity by creating a time constant intercept 
for each country in the sample which absorbs all country specific factors which are constant 
(stable and unmeasured) over each wave ( Wooldridge, 2002; Allison, 2005). Because the FE 
focuses on within-unit changes over time, countries are included in the analysis only if they 
exhibit change on the outcome over time. Thus, countries that do not change on the outcome 
variable over time are dropped from the model. Additionally, the FE model does not estimate the 
effects of time stable co-variates on changes over time. Because the fixed effects model does not 
estimate coefficients for variables that do not have any within-country variation and ignores all 
between-country variation in the estimation, the FE approach can result in a substantial increase 
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in sampling variability (Allison, 2005). In spite of disadvantages of the FE approach, this 
approach is considered an incredibly powerful and useful tool for isolating causal effects in 
observational studies (Fahey and LaFree. 2015; Allison, 2005). I use a fixed effects negative 
binomial model to examine the effects of within-country changes in state-based human rights 
violations on annual counts of terrorism. 
Effects of Between-Country Differences in HRV on Annual Changes in Terrorism. Generalized 
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) techniques are one approach for estimating the effects of 
between-country predictors on annual changes in terrorism. HLM is also useful for handling the 
lack of independence in country-level observations. The data is considered clustered or nested 
because it contains country-year observations that are nested in countries over time, and thus 
observations within countries over time are not independent (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). HLM 
is able to estimate the between-country level effects of country-level predictors on annual 
changes in terrorism activity, while also accounting for over dispersion in the outcome. I use a 
HLM Poisson model with an over-dispersion correction to specify a two-level equation. At the 
Level 1 equation, I model within-country changes in terrorist attacks over time, controlling for 
the effects of time. At the Level 2 equation, I estimate the effects of the between-country 
differences in human rights violations on the average level of terrorist attacks. 
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Chapter 5 
Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 In this chapter, I first discuss descriptive statistics for the sample and data, and then 
discuss results generated from the main and supplemental analyses. Table 2 displays the 
descriptive statistics for each variable used in the current study.  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
  N Min Max Mean  
Std. 
Deviation 
Total Attacks 5518 0.00 3925 23.83 119.83 
Fatal Attacks 5514 0.00 2518 10.86 68.77 
Attributed Attacks 5518 0.00 3370 17.96 100.30 
Amnesty International 4460 1.00 5.00 2.70 1.11 
Log Population 5400 11.07 21.03 15.84 1.75 
Urbanization 5402 4.34 100 51.29 23.90 
Log GDP 5107 4.17 11.54 7.75 1.60 
GDP Growth 5057 -64.99 149.97 3.41 6.74 
Democracy 5105 -10.00 10.00 1.85 7.15 
Regime Durability 5157 0.00 205 24.33 29.78 
Civil Liberties Violations 5458 1.0 7.0 3.85 1.89 
Political Rights Violations 5458 1.0 7.0 3.84 2.21 
State Failure 5481 0.00 13.50 .54 1.52 
Sex Ratio 2275 1.01 1.17 1.05 0.02 
Ethnic Fractionalization 2619 0.001 0.93 0.41 029 
      
The distribution of terrorism is highly skewed in the data. Approximately 48.5% of 
country-year observations had zero attacks for a given year. Similarly, 63.84% and 53.24% of all 
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country-year observations had zero fatal and attributed attacks. Figure 1 displays the distribution 
of total, fatal and attributed attacks from 1980 to 2014.  
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Terrorism Trends, 1980-2014.  
 
 
All three terrorism trends have a similar shape but present at different levels. From 1980 
to the early 1990s, terrorism remained relatively stable and declines post 1992, reaching a low in 
1999. Most noticeable is the substantial increase in terrorism in the late 2000s. It is important to 
note that these global terrorism trends in terrorism may not hold at the country-level as prior 
research has found different country-level trends of terrorism over time (LaFree, Morris and 
Dugan, 2009). Thus, specific countries may not exhibit country-level trends that mirror the 
overall global terrorism trends. 
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The average score for state-based human rights violations for all countries across the time 
span is 2.70 (n = 4,460), with a standard deviation of 1.11 (See Table 2), and the average 
country-level score for state-based human rights violations is 2.57 (n = 174), with a standard 
deviation of 0.90. Substantively this indicates that most countries do not engage in extreme 
human rights violations. Rather the average indicates that most countries have scores that reflect 
limited amounts of political imprisonment (level 2) to extensive political imprisonment (level 3).  
Table 3 displays a correlation matrix of all variables used in the analysis.  Based on the 
reported correlations, I do not include measures of overall democracy and civil liberties or 
political freedom in the same model because of high correlations (>.70).15  GDP and urbanization 
are also not included the same model due to moderately high correlations. I include GDP as a 
measure of economic development in my main analyses, and include urbanization in 
supplemental analyses.   Bivariate correlations indicate that population (r= 0.15, p<0.001), 
human rights violations (r = 0.25, p<0.001), GDP (r = -0.05, p<0.001), GDP growth (r = -0.33, 
p<0.05), state failure (r = 0.26, p<0.001) and democracy (r = 0.09, p<0.001) are significantly 
related to total attacks. Violations of civil liberties is only significantly related to fatal attacks (r 
= 0.05, p<0.01), and violations of political freedom is not correlated with any of the terrorism 
outcomes.16
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Many of the variables included my models are both conceptually related and empirically 
correlated with each other. If high multicollinearity exists, estimation produces large standard 
errors for slope coefficients, and produces unreliable estimates (Lewis-Beck, 1980).  There are a 
number of signs that may indicate multicollinearity.  First, an inspection of the correlations 
between independent variables can indicate multicollinearity.  Correlations greater .70 are 
generally considered problematic. Second, models with a high R-squared but yet statistically 
insignificant coefficients can indicate high collinearity.  Third, a regression coefficient that 
changes substantially (significance or sign) when including or dropping other independent 
variables also may indicate high collinearity (Lewis-Beck, 1980).   
16 Table 1 in the Appendix B displays a pairwise correlation matrix.!
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Annual 
Total 
Attacks
Annual 
Fatal 
Attacks
Annual 
Attributed 
Attacks
Amnesty 
Human 
Rights
Population Urbanization GDP_percapita GDP_growth Democracy
Regime 
Durability
Civil 
Liberties
Political 
Rights 
State Failure
Pearson Correlation 1.00 0.96** 0.98** 0.25** 0.15** 0.02 *0.05** *0.03* 0.09** *0.02 0.02 *0.03 0.26**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.29 0.13 0.10 0.00
Pearson Correlation 0.96** 1.00 0.95** 0.24** 0.14** *0.01 *0.06** *0.03 0.06** *0.03* 0.05** 0.01 0.25**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.63 0.00
Pearson Correlation 0.98** 0.95** 1.00 0.23** 0.15** 0.02 *0.04* *0.02 0.09** *0.01 0.02 *0.02 0.22**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.21 0.00 0.45 0.17 0.15 0.00
Pearson Correlation 0.25** 0.24** 0.23** 1.00 0.18** *0.29** *0.43** *0.03 *0.29** *0.29** 0.50** 0.42** 0.50**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pearson Correlation 0.15** 0.14** 0.15** 0.18** 1.00 *0.07** *0.03 0.08** 0.01 0.17** 0.03 0.00 0.06**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.07 0.77 0.00
Pearson Correlation 0.02 *0.01 0.02 *0.29** *0.07** 1.00 0.57** *0.07** 0.33** 0.34** *0.43** *0.41** *0.19**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.20 0.39 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pearson Correlation *0.05** *0.06** *0.04* *0.43** *0.03 0.57** 1.00 *0.04** 0.33** 0.61** *0.49** *0.44** *.016**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pearson Correlation *0.03* *0.03 *0.02 *0.03 0.08** *0.07** *0.04** 1.00 *0.03* *0.02 0.04** 0.05** *0.14**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.04 0.10 0.21 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.29 0.01 0.00 0.00
Pearson Correlation 0.09** 0.06** 0.09** *0.29** 0.01 0.33** 0.33** *0.03* 1.00 0.20** *0.85** *0.89** *0.11**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pearson Correlation *0.02 *0.03* *0.01 *0.29** 0.17** 0.34** 0.61** *0.02 0.20** 1.00 *0.33** *0.29** *0.14**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.29 0.05 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pearson Correlation 0.02 0.05** 0.02 0.50** 0.03 *0.43** *0.49** 0.04** *0.85** *0.33** 1.00 0.92** 0.26**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.13 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pearson Correlation *0.03 0.01 *0.02 0.42** 0.00 *0.41** *0.44** 0.05** *0.89** *0.29** 0.92** 1.00 0.20**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.10 0.63 0.15 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pearson Correlation 0.26** 0.25** 0.22** 0.50** 0.06** *0.19** *0.16** *0.14** *.011** *0.14** 0.26** 0.20** 1.00
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
c Listwise N=3891
Political Rights 
State Failure
Urbanization
GDP_percapita
GDP_growth
Democracy
Regime Durability
Civil Liberties
Table 3  Correlation Matrix 
Annual Total Attacks
Annual Fatal Attacks
Annual Attributed Attacks
Amnesty Human Rights
Population
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5.2 Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Regression (FENB) Results for Hypothesis 1 
 In the following sections, I discuss the results for the analyses examining within-country 
effects of state-based human rights violations on annual terrorism attacks. As stated in hypothesis 
1, I expect that within-country increases in state-based violations of human rights are 
significantly related to increases in within-country terrorism events over time, controlling for 
other socio-political and demographic variables.  
Total Attacks 
Table 4 presents the results from a series of reduced and full fixed effects negative 
binomial models for total attacks. Models 1 through 3 are baseline models that do not include 
state-based human rights violations and only include demographic, economic and political 
variables. Models 4 through 6 are my full models that include state-based human rights 
violations and all other control variables.  
 Model 1 indicates that population is significantly and positively (b = 2.75, p<0.001) 
correlated with annual total attacks. This indicates that countries which have increases in 
population also have increases in annual terrorist attacks. Population remains significant 
throughout the baseline and full models.  Model 2 includes population and economic measures, 
GDP and economic growth (GDP growth). Whereas population remains significantly and 
positively related to annual attacks, GDP (b = -0.32, p<0.001) and GDP growth (b = -0.01, 
p<0.001) are negative and significant. Model 3 introduces all of the political variables into the 
model, which includes democracy, regime length and state failure.  
Population (b = 1.84, p<.001), regime length (b = -0.04, p<0.001) and state failure (b = 0.43, 
p<0.001) are significantly related to annual terrorism attacks. Models 4 through 6 present the 
final models which include all control variables.  
Model 4 includes the aggregated measure of democracy, and models 5 and 6 include 
disaggregated measures of democracy, civil liberty and political freedom violations. State-based 
human rights violations are positively (b = 0.63, p<0.001) related to total attacks, even after 
controlling for other economic and political measures, and using both aggregated and 
disaggregated measures of democracy. Population also remains positively and significantly 
related to annual terrorism across all models.  
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Table 4. Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Regression (FENB) Results 
Baseline (Models 1 - 3) and Full Models (Models 4 – 6): TOTAL ATTACKS 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Human Rights Violations    0.63*** 
0.05 
0.58*** 
0.04 
0.60*** 
0.04 
Population 2.75*** 
0.24 
1.96*** 
0.27 
1.84*** 
.30 
2.30*** 
0.33 
2.10*** 
0.29 
2.21*** 
0.29 
GDP  -0.32*** 
0.09 
0.03 
0.10 
0.16 
0.14 
0.16* 
0.09 
0.16* 
0.09 
GDP Growth  -0.01** 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00* 
0.00 
0.01* 
0.00 
Democracy   -0.00 
0.01 
0.03** 
0.01 
  
Regime Durability   -.04*** 
0.00 
-0.03*** 
0.00 
-0.04** 
0.04 
-0.03*** 
0.00 
Civil Liberty Violations     0.12** 
0.04 
 
Political Freedom Violations      0.03 
0.03 
State Failure   0.43*** 
0.03 
0.31*** 
0.03 
0.30*** 
0.02 
0.31*** 
0.02 
       
       
NT 5239 4893 4622 3880 3910 3910 
N 164 163 155 155 155 155 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; *p<0.05 
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Regime durability is also significantly (p<0.001) related to terrorism in all models. 
Within-country increases in regime stability are related to annual decreases in terrorism 
across all models. As expected from the prior literature, state failure (b = 0.31, p<0.001) is 
positively and consistently related to annual increases in terrorism. Countries that experience 
increases in civil wars, ethnic or revolutionary wars, genocide or politicides are substantially 
more likely to experience annual increases in terrorism. Finally, model 4 also indicates that 
democracy is positively (b = 0.03, p<0.01) related to terrorism, indicating that increases in a 
country’s level of democracy is related to increases in annual terrorism.  
Models 5 and 6 are full models using measures of civil liberty violations and political 
freedom violations rather than the overall measure of democracy. The results from models 5 
and 6 are quite similar to results from model 4. The results indicate that countries which have 
increases in human rights violations also experience increases in annual terrorist attacks (b = 
0.58 and b = 0.60, p<0.001). Population (b = 2.10 and b = 2.21 p<.001), regime durability (b 
= -0.03 and b = -0.03, p<0.001) and state failure (b = 0.30 and b = 0.31, p<0.001) are also 
significantly related to changes in annual terrorism counts. Within-country increases in civil 
liberty violations (b = 0.12, p <0.01), but not political freedom violations, are related to 
within-country increases annual terrorism. Thus, countries that experience increases in civil 
liberty violations also experience increases in annual terrorist attacks. Finally, in models 5 
and 6, GDP (b = 0.16 and b = 0.16, p<0.05) and GDP growth (b = 0.00 and b = 0.01, p<0.05) 
are positively related to annual terrorism attacks. Countries that experience increases in both 
overall economic development and growth are likely to have increases in annual terrorism. 
 I also conducted several supplemental analyses to examine the robustness of the state-
based human rights violations and terrorism relationship, and to examine the effects of 
urbanization on terrorism. Table 5 (models 7 – 9) present the within-country results from the 
full models including urbanization (rather than GDP) as a measure of economic development. 
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The results in models 7 through 9 are consistent with results from models 4 through 6 shown 
in Table 4. Urbanization does not attain significance in the final models. The substantive 
results for the remaining variables are similar to those for total attacks. Specifically, state-
based violations of human rights, population, democracy, regime durability, and state failure 
are significant across all models. As in the case of the main analysis for total attacks, when 
using a disaggregated measure of democracy, only violation of civil liberties is related to 
annual changes in total attacks. Specifically, countries with increases in civil liberty 
violations are also likely to experience increases in annual terrorism. 
Fatal Terrorist Attacks 
Table 6 presents results from the set of analyses examining within-country-level 
changes in state-based human rights violations on annual changes in fatal terrorism attacks. 
Models 1 through 3 present results from the baseline models including only control variables, 
while models 4 through 6 show the full models with state-based human right violations 
included in the models. As in the analyses for total attacks, the results indicate that increases 
in state-based violations of human rights is significantly related to increases in fatal terrorist 
attacks (models 4 - 6).  
Model 4 indicates that within-country changes in population (b = 3.52, p<0.001), 
democracy (b = 0.03, p<0.01), GDP (b = 0.24, p<0.05), regime durability (b = -0.02, 
p<0.001), state failure (b = 0.33, p<0.001) and human rights violations (b = 0.74, p<0.001) 
predict changes in annual fatal attacks. Additionally, model 5 indicates that within-country 
increases in violations of civil liberties (b = 0.13, p<0.01) is related to increases in terrorism. 
Changes in protection of political freedom has no effect on annual changes in fatal attacks. 
The measure of economic growth, GDP growth (b = 0.23 and b = 0.24, p<0.05), is only 
significantly related to fatal terrorist attacks in the full models including disaggregated 
measures of democracy.  
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Table 5. Sensitivity Analyses:  
Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Regression (FENB) Supplemental Results 
Full Models (Models 7– 9) TOTAL ATTACKS 
 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Human Rights Violations 0.62*** 
0.04 
0.57*** 
0.04 
0.60*** 
0.04 
Population 2.17*** 
0.28 
1.95*** 
0.28 
2.06*** 
0.28 
Urbanization -0.00 
0.01 
-0.00 
0.01 
-0.00 
0.01 
GDP Growth 0.01 
0.00 
0.01* 
0.00 
0.001* 
0.00 
Democracy 0.03*** 
0.01 
  
Regime Durability -0.03*** 
0.00 
-0.04*** 
0.00 
-0.03*** 
0.00 
Civil Liberty Violations  0.13*** 
0.04 
 
Political Freedom Violations   0.03 
0.03 
State Failure .031*** 
0.02 
0.29*** 
0.02 
0.30*** 
0.02 
    
    
NT 3940 3971 3971 
N 156 156 156 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Table 6. Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Regression (FENB) Results 
Baseline (Models 1 - 3) and Full Models (Models 4 – 6): FATAL ATTACKS 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Human Rights Violations    0.74*** 
0.05 
0.70*** 
0.04 
0.72*** 
0.04 
Population 3.59*** 
0.29 
2.66*** 
0.32 
3.07*** 
0.38 
3.52*** 
0.43 
3.33*** 
0.35 
3.45*** 
0.35 
GDP  -0.34*** 
0.10 
0.11 
0.09 
0.24** 
0.12 
0.23* 
0.10 
0.24* 
0.10 
GDP Growth  -0.00** 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01* 
0.00 
0.01* 
0.00 
Democracy   0.01 
0.01 
0.03* 
0.01 
  
Regime Durability   -0.04*** 
0.01 
-0.02*** 
0.00 
-0.03*** 
0.00 
-0.03*** 
0.00 
Civil Liberty Violations     0.13** 
0.04 
 
Political Freedom Violations      0.02 
0.03 
State Failure   0.48*** 
0.03 
0.33*** 
0.03 
0.31*** 
0.04 
0.32*** 
0.02 
       
       
NT 4719 4381 4225 3638 3668 3668 
N 147 146 142 142 142 142 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Table 7 presents results from the within-country supplemental analyses including 
urbanization and omitting GDP to predict annual changes in fatal attacks. State-based human 
rights violations are significantly and positively related to annual fatal attacks across all 
models (model 7 through model 9). Model 7 indicates that within-country increases in state-
based human rights violations (b = 0.74, p<0.001) lead to increases in fatal attacks, net of 
controls for other variables. As in the supplemental analyses for total attacks, increases in 
population, GDP growth, democracy, and state failure are significantly related to increases in 
fatal attacks. Within-country increases in the stability of the regime are also related to 
decreases in fatal attacks over time. However, unlike previous supplemental results for total 
attacks, urbanization is significant throughout all models (7 - 9). Thus, countries that have 
increases in the percent of the population living in urban areas are also likely to experience an 
increase in annual fatal attacks.  
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Table 7. Sensitivity Analyses:  
Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Regression (FENB) Supplemental Results 
Full Models (Models 7 – 9) FATAL ATTACKS 
 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Human Rights Violations 0.74*** 
0.04 
0.69*** 
0.04 
0.72*** 
0.04 
Population 3.12*** 
0.33 
2.91*** 
0.33 
3.06*** 
0.33 
Urbanization 0.04** 
0.01 
0.04*** 
0.01 
0.04*** 
0.01 
GDP Growth 0.01* 
0.00 
0.01** 
0.00 
0.01** 
0.00 
Democracy 0.03** 
0.01 
  
Regime Durability -0.02*** 
0.00 
-0.03*** 
0.02 
-0.03*** 
0.00 
Civil Liberty Violations  0.15*** 
0.04 
 
Political Freedom Violations   0.02 
0.03 
State Failure 0.32*** 
0.02 
0.31*** 
0.02 
0.32*** 
0.02 
    
NT 3698 3729 3729 
N 143 143 143 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Attributed Attacks 
Table 8 presents the results from the within-country analyses of annual attributed 
terrorist attacks over time. Again, these results are similar to those for total and fatal attacks. 
Model 4 indicates that within-country changes in state-based violations of human rights are 
positively and significantly (b = 0.68, p<0.001) related to changes in annual attributed events, 
controlling for all other economic, political and demographic variables. State failure is also 
positively and significantly (b = 0.28, p<0.001) related to annual attributed terrorism events. 
Other than state-based violations of human rights and state failure, population (b = 2.62, 
p<0.001), regime durability (b = -0.02, p<0.001) and democracy (b = 0.02, p<0.01) are also 
significantly related to changes in annual attributed attacks. Models 5 and 6 examine the 
effects of human rights violations while controlling for disaggregated measures of 
democracy. As in the prior analyses, only violations of civil liberties (b = 0.14, p<0.001) is 
significantly related to attributed terrorism events—countries that experience increases in 
civil liberties violations experience increases in attributed attacks. State-based human rights 
violations are significantly related to attributed attacks across all models (4 – 6). 
Table 9 presents results from supplemental analyses replacing the GDP measure with 
the urbanization measure. The results are consistent with those obtained in the main analysis 
of attributed attacks including GDP. Within-country changes in state-based human rights 
violations are related to changes in annual attributed attacks across all models, net of other 
control variables. Within-country changes in population, democracy, regime durability, state 
failure, and civil liberty violations were all significantly related to changes in annual 
attributed terrorist attacks. 
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Table 8. Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Regression (FENB) Results 
Baseline (Models 1 - 3) and Full Models (Models 4 – 6): ATTRIBUTED ATTACKS 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Human Rights Violations    .68*** 
.04 
0.64*** 
0.04 
0.66*** 
0.04 
Population 2.98*** 
0.26 
2.15*** 
0.29 
2.16*** 
0.32 
2.62*** 
0.36 
2.39*** 
0.31 
2.53*** 
0.31 
GDP  -0.32*** 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.14 
0.11 
0.15 
0.09 
0.14 
0.09 
GDP Growth  -0.01** 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01* 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
Democracy   -0.00 
0.01 
0.02** 
0.01 
  
Regime Durability   -0.03*** 
0.00 
-0.02*** 
0.00 
-0.03*** 
0.00 
-.03*** 
0.00 
Civil Liberty Violations     0.14*** 
0.04 
 
Political Freedom Violations      0.04 
0.03 
State Failure   0.40*** 
0.02 
0.28*** 
0.02 
0.26*** 
0.04 
0.27*** 
0.02 
       
       
NT 4722 4384 4228 3641 3671 3671 
N 142 146 142 142 142 142 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
   
! 63 
 
Table 9. Sensitivity Analyses:  
Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Regression (FENB) Supplemental Results 
Full Models (Models 7 – 9): ATTRIBUTED ATTACKS 
 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Human Rights Violations 0.66*** 
0.04 
0.61*** 
0.04 
0.63*** 
0.04 
Population 2.50*** 
0.29 
2.26*** 
0.29 
2.40*** 
0.29 
Urbanization -0.01 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.01 
GDP Growth 0.01 
0.00 
0.01* 
0.00 
0.01* 
0.00 
Democracy 0.03** 
0.01 
  
Regime Durability -0.02*** 
0.00 
-0.03*** 
0.00 
-0.03*** 
0.00 
Civil Liberty Violations  0.14*** 
0.04 
 
Political Freedom Violations   0.04 
0.03 
State Failure 0.28*** 
0.02 
0.26*** 
0.02 
0.27*** 
0.02 
    
NT 3860 3891 3891 
N 151 151 151 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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5.3 Multivariate HGLM Poisson Regression Results for Hypothesis 2 
 In the following sections, I discuss the results for the analyses examining between-
country effects of state-based human rights violations on annual terrorism attacks. Whereas 
the previous models were focused on assessing within-country changes on within-country 
changes in terrorism attacks, this set of analyses focuses on the effects of between-country 
level differences in state-based human rights violations on annual changes in terrorism. In 
other words, the FENB regression models explain within-country changes in terrorist attacks 
over time using within-country changes in the predictor variable, and discards any between-
country variation. The HGLM models assess the effects of between-country differences on 
changes in annual terrorist attacks.  
Total Attacks 
Table 10 presents the results from all full models predicting total attacks. Across all 
models, countries with higher levels of human rights violations, as compared to countries 
with lower human rights violations, are associated with increases in annual terrorism attacks 
(Models 1 - 6). Model 1 indicates that countries with larger populations (b = 0.38, p<0.001) 
and higher GDP (b = 0.39, p<0.001), as compared to those with lower, experience increases 
in terrorism over time. Countries that are more democratic (b = 0.10, p<0.001) also 
experience more total attacks. On the contrary, countries that experience more economic 
growth (b = -0.10, p<0.05) are less likely to have increases in annual terrorism attacks. Both 
human rights violations (b = 1.54, p<0.001) and state failure (b = 0.36, p<0.001) are also 
significant predictors of increased annual terrorism counts. Unlike the within-country 
analyses, however, regime durability is not significantly related to terrorism in any of the 
models.  
Models 2 and 3 include the disaggregated measure of democracy, civil liberty 
violations and political freedom violations. Again, state-based human rights violations (b = 
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1.56 and b = 1.69, p<0.001) are positively associated with annual terrorism counts. All other 
variables also operate in the same direction as in model 1. Both disaggregated measures of 
democracy also operate in a similar fashion as the aggregate democracy measure in model 1. 
Countries with more political (b = -0.34, p<0.001) and civil liberty violations (b = -0.44, 
p<0.001) are associated with decreases in annual terrorism. Thus, those countries with 
stronger protections for political freedom and civil liberties are associated with increases in 
terrorism over time, much like countries with higher aggregate democracy scores experience 
more terrorism over time. Models 4 through 6 replicate the analyses including urbanization in 
the model. Substantively, the results remain largely the same, with the exception that GDP 
growth is not significant in the model containing urbanization. Urbanization is significantly 
related to annual terrorism counts over time (models 4 – 6), net of controls for other 
variables. Countries with larger urban (b = 0.02, p<0.01) populations experience more 
terrorism over time.  
 Table 11 displays results from a set of supplemental analyses using a smaller subset 
of the sample. These analyses examine the effects of between-country differences in sex ratio 
and ethnic fractionalization on annual changes in terrorism. Notice the sample sizes drop with 
the inclusion of sex ratio and ethnic fractionalization. The effects of state-based human rights 
violations, as well as many other variables (e.g., population, state failure, GDP, democracy; 
civil liberty and political freedom violations) are the same across all supplemental analyses—
countries with higher levels of state-based human rights violations, as compared to countries 
with lower, experience more terrorism attacks over time. Between-country differences in the 
level of ethnic fractionalization and sex ratio are not significantly related to annual terrorism 
counts.
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Table 10. Multivariate HGLM Poisson Regression Main Results, Full Models: TOTAL ATTACKS 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Human Rights Violations 1.54*** 
0.22 
1.56*** 
0.23 
1.69*** 
0.23 
1.34*** 
0.12 
1.57*** 
0.24 
1.42*** 
0.23 
Population 0.38*** 
0.08 
0.38*** 
0.08 
0.38*** 
0.09 
0.40*** 
0.08 
0.39*** 
0.09 
0.39*** 
0.09 
GDP 0.39*** 
0.09 
0.33*** 
0.10 
0.34*** 
0.10 
   
GDP Growth -0.10* 
0.05 
-0.11* 
0.05 
-0.11* 
0.05 
-0.08 
0.05 
-0.10 
0.05 
-0.9 
0.05 
Urbanization    0.02*** 
0.00 
0.02*** 
0.01 
0.02*** 
0.01 
Democracy 0.10*** 
0.02 
  0.11*** 
0.02 
  
Regime Durability -0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
Civil Liberty Violations   -0.44*** 
0.100 
 -0.49*** 
0.10 
 
Political Freedom Violations  -0.34*** 
0.08 
   -0.38*** 
0.08 
State Failure 0.36** 
0.11 
0.41*** 
0.12 
0.40*** 
0.11 
0.42*** 
0.12 
0.46*** 
0.12 
0.47*** 
0.12 
       
NT 5304 5304 5304 5304 5304 5304 
N 156 156 156 156 156 156 
       *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Table 11. Multivariate HGLM Poisson Regression Supplemental Results,  
Full Models: TOTAL ATTACKS 
 Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Human Rights Violations 1.59*** 
0.24 
1.59*** 
0.25 
1.72*** 
0.26 
1.40*** 
0.23 
1.47*** 
0.25 
1.61*** 
0.26 
Population 0.33*** 
0.09 
0.34*** 
0.10 
0.34*** 
0.10 
0.35*** 
0.09 
0.34*** 
0.10 
0.34*** 
0.10 
Sex Ratio 3.70 
6.85 
5.56 
7.23 
5.09 
7.30 
3.53 
6.60 
5.43 
7.14 
4.92 
7.14 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.12 
0.49 
-0.17 
0.49 
-0.22 
0.49 
-0.31 
0.48 
-.30 
0.48 
-.36 
0.48 
GDP 0.32* 
0.10 
0.26* 
0.11 
0.26* 
0.11 
   
GDP Growth -0.10 
0.06 
-0.11* 
0.06 
-0.13* 
0.06 
-0.10 
0.06 
-0.11 
0.06 
-0.12* 
0.06 
Urbanization    0.01* 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
Democracy 0.11*** 
0.02 
  0.12*** 
0.02 
  
Regime Durability 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Civil Liberty Violations   -0.46*** 
0.11 
  -0.50*** 
 
Political Freedom 
Violations 
 -.35*** 
0.08 
  -0.39*** 
0.08 
 
State Failure 0.37** 
0.13 
0.44*** 
0.13 
0.44*** 
0.13 
0.43** 
0.14 
0.48*** 
0.13 
0.48*** 
0.13 
       
NT  4998 4998 4998 4998 4998 
N  147 147 147 147 147 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
Fatal Attacks 
Table 12 presents the between-country results for fatal attacks. Model 1 indicates that 
state-based human rights violations are positively associated with fatal attacks, controlling for 
demographic, economic and political variables. Countries with higher levels of state-based 
human rights violations (b = 1.78, p<0.001) experience more fatal attacks over time. 
Additionally, countries with larger populations (b = 0.34, p<0.001), higher GDP (b = 0.22, 
p<0.05), and more democratic countries (b = 0.08, p<0.001) experience more fatal attacks, as 
compared to countries with lower levels of these variables. As in the case of the between-
country analysis of total attacks over time, countries with higher levels of civil liberty 
violations (b = -0.32, p<0.001) and political freedom violations (b = -0.26, p<0.001) are less 
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likely to experience increases in fatal terrorism attacks over time. Again, this operates in a 
similar fashion as the overall democracy measure. Finally, regime durability is not 
significantly related to annual fatal attacks (1 – 6).  
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Table 12. Multivariate HGLM Poisson Regression Main Results, Full Models: FATAL ATTACKS 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Human Rights Violations 1.78*** 
0.25 
1.79*** 
0.25 
1.89*** 
0.26 
1.65*** 
0.24 
1.71*** 
0.25 
1.80*** 
0.27 
Population 0.34*** 
0.09 
0.34*** 
0.10 
0.34*** 
0.09 
0.36*** 
0.09 
0.35*** 
0.10 
0.35*** 
010 
GDP 0.22* 
0.09 
0.19 
0.10 
0.19 
0.10 
   
GDP Growth -0.08 
0.06 
-0.09 
0.06 
-0.09 
0.06 
-0.08 
0.06 
-0.09 
0.06 
-0.09 
0.06 
Urbanization    0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
Democracy 0.08*** 
0.03 
  0.09*** 
0.02 
  
Regime Durability 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Civil Liberty Violations   -0.32*** 
0.11 
  -0.36*** 
0.11 
Political Freedom Violations  -0.26*** 
0.09 
  -0.28*** 
0.08 
 
State Failure 0.39*** 
0.12 
0.43*** 
0.12 
0.42*** 
0.12 
0.43*** 
0.12 
0.46*** 
0.12 
0.046*** 
0.12 
       
NT 5304 5304 5304 5304 5304 5304 
N 156 156 156 156 156 156 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Table 13 displays supplemental results including sex ratio and ethnic fractionalization 
as predictors of annual fatal attacks. Once again, between-country differences in state-based 
human rights violations significantly predicts annual fatal attacks, net of other variables and 
model specifications. Similarly, more democratic (overall democracy and disaggregated 
components of democracy) countries, larger populations, and countries which have more acts 
of state failure experience more fatal attacks over time.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
Neither sex ratio or ethnic fractionalization are significantly related to annual fatal attacks. 
Attributed Attacks 
Table 14 displays the between-country analyses predicting annual attributed attacks 
over time. As in the case of the between-country analyses of total and fatal attacks, state-
Table 13. Multivariate HGLM Poisson Regression Supplemental Results, Full Models: 
FATAL ATTACKS 
 Model  
1 
Model  
2 
Model  
3 
Model  
4 
Model 
 5 
Model 
6 
Human Rights 
Violations 
1.82*** 
0.27 
1.82*** 
0.27 
1.91*** 
0.28 
1.70*** 
0.26 
1.74*** 
0.27 
1.84*** 
0.28 
Population 0.32** 
0.10 
0.33** 
0.10 
0.32*** 
0.10 
0.34*** 
0.10 
0.33** 
0.10 
0.33** 
0.10 
Sex Ratio 4.37 
7.15 
5.71 
7.48 
5.42 
7.59 
4.72 
7.15 
6.11 
7.51 
5.81 
7.59 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
0.23 
0.48 
0.19 
0.49 
0.16 
0.49 
0.06 
0.48 
0.06 
0.49 
0.02 
0.49 
GDP 0.19 
0.11 
0.14 
0.12 
0.14 
0.13 
   
GDP Growth -0.122 
0.07 
-0.14* 
0.07 
-0.15* 
0.07 
-0.13 
0.07 
-0.14 
0.07 
-0.15* 
0.07 
Urbanization    0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
Democracy 0.08*** 
0.02 
  0.09*** 
0.03 
  
Regime Durability 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Civil Liberty 
Violations 
  -0.33*** 
0.11 
  -0.37* 
0.11 
Political Freedom 
Violations 
 -0.26** 
0.09 
  -0.29** 
0.09 
 
State Failure 0.40*** 
0.13 
0.46*** 
0.13 
0.46*** 
0.13 
0.44** 
0.13 
0.49*** 
0.013 
0.49*** 
0.13 
       
NT 4998 4998 4998 4998 4998 4998 
N 147 147 147 147 147 147 
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based human rights violations are positively and significantly related to annual attributed 
terrorism events across all models (1 – 6). Model 1 indicates that countries with high levels of 
state-based violations of human rights (b = 1.53, p<0.001) experience more attributed attacks 
over time, net of other control variables. Additionally, population (b = 0.41, p<0.001), GDP 
(b = 0.35, p<0.001), democracy (b = 0.41, p<0.001), and state failure (b = 0.39, p<0.001) are 
all significantly related to annual attributed attacks. Regime durability is once again not 
significant in any of the between-country analyses of terrorism. 
Models 2 and 3 present the results from the analyses using a disaggregated measure of 
democracy. Countries with higher civil liberty (b = -0.44, p<0.001) and political freedom 
violations (b = -0.34, p<0.001), as compared to those with lower levels of violations, have 
less annual attributed events. Again, both the disaggregated political variables operate in the 
same manner as the overall aggregate measure of democracy in the between-country 
analyses—countries with higher levels of democracy tend to experience more attributed 
events over time. Models 4 through 6 indicate that countries with larger urban populations (b 
= 0.02, p<0.01; b = 0.01, p<0.05; b = 0.01, p<.0.05) are also more likely to experience 
increases in attributed terrorism events.  
Table 15 presents the supplemental results for attributed attacks after including sex 
ratio and ethnic fractionalization into the regression models (models 1- 6). As in previous 
models, sex ratio and ethnic fractionalization are not significant predictors of attributed 
attacks over time. Across all models, state-based human rights violations are significantly and 
positively related to terrorism, regardless of the variables included in the models. Countries 
with higher levels of human rights violations experience more attributed attacks than 
countries with lower levels of human rights violations.  Additionally, results for the overall 
democracy and disaggregated components of democracy operate in a similar fashion across 
all models examining the between country-level effects of political variables on annual 
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changes in the terrorism. Table 16 displays a summary of consistently significant findings 
across models for the within-country and between-country analyses of total, fatal and 
attributed attacks. 
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Table 14. Multivariate HGLM Poisson Regression Main Results, Full Models: ATTRIBUTED ATTACKS 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Human Rights Violations 1.53*** 
0.23 
1.56*** 
0.24 
1.70*** 
0.25 
1.34*** 
0.23 
1.43*** 
0.25 
1.57*** 
0.25 
Population 0.41*** 
0.09 
0.41*** 
0.09 
0.41*** 
0.09 
0.43*** 
0.09 
0.42*** 
0.10 
0.42*** 
0.09 
GDP 0.35*** 
0.09 
0.30*** 
0.10 
0.30*** 
0.10 
   
GDP Growth -0.11 
0.06 
-0.11 
0.06 
-0.11* 
0.06 
-0.09 
0.06 
-0.10 
0.06 
-0.11 
0.06 
Urbanization    0.02*** 
0.00 
0.01* 
0.01 
0.01* 
0.00 
Democracy 0.41*** 
0.09 
  0.11*** 
0.02 
  
Regime Durability 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Civil Liberty Violations   -0.44*** 
0.10 
  -0.49*** 
0.10 
Political Freedom Violations  -0.34*** 
0.08 
  -0.38*** 
0.09 
 
State Failure 0.39*** 
0.13 
0.44*** 
0.13 
0.44*** 
0.13 
0.45*** 
0.13 
0.49*** 
0.13 
0.49** 
0.13 
       
NT 5304 5304 5304 5304 5304 5304 
N 156 156 156 156 156 156 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Table 15. Multivariate HGLM Poisson Regression Supplemental Results, Full Models: ATTRIBUTED ATTACKS 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Human Rights Violations 1.59*** 
0.26 
1.60*** 
0.26 
1.74*** 
0.27 
1.40*** 
0.25 
1.47*** 
0.26 
1.62*** 
0.27 
Population 0.37*** 
0.09 
0.36*** 
0.10 
0.36*** 
0.10 
0.38*** 
0.09 
0.37*** 
0.10 
0.37*** 
0.10 
Sex Ratio 4.13 
6.92 
5.93 
7.27 
5.60 
7.36 
4.13 
6.80 
5.96 
7.23 
5.50 
7.29 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.08 
0.51 
0.04 
0.50 
-0.01 
0.51 
-0.14 
0.50 
-0.12 
0.50 
-0.17 
0.51 
GDP 0.33** 
0.11 
0.26* 
0.12 
0.26* 
0.11 
   
GDP Growth -0.10 
0.06 
-0.12 
0.06 
-0.13* 
0.06 
-0.10 
0.06 
-0.12 
0.06 
-0.12* 
0.06 
Urbanization    0.01* 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
Democracy 0.10*** 
0.02 
  0.11*** 
0.02 
  
Regime Durability 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
Civil Liberty Violations   -0.45*** 
0.11 
  -0.49*** 
0.11 
Political Freedom Violations  -0.34*** 
0.09 
  -0.38*** 
0.09 
 
State Failure 0.39** 
0.14 
0.46** 
0.14 
0.45*** 
0.14 
0.45** 
0.15 
0.50*** 
0.14 
0.50*** 
0.15 
       
NT 4998 4998 4998 4998 4998 4998 
N 147 147 147 147 147 147 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Table 16. Summary of Within-Country and Between-Country Analyses of Predictors of 
Total, Fatal and Attributed Terrorist Attacks 
Variable 
Within-
Country 
(Total) 
Between-
Country 
(Total) 
Within-
Country  
(Fatal) 
Between-
Country 
 (Fatal) 
Within-
Country 
(Attributed) 
Between-
Country 
(Attributed) 
State-based 
Humans 
Rights 
Violations 
 +*** + *** + *** + ***  + ***  + *** 
Population  +***  + *** + *** + *** + ***  + *** 
GDP + * +*** + * + *  + ** 
GDP Growth + * - * + *  + *  
Urbanization  + ** + **   + * 
Democracy  + ** + *** + * + *** + ** + *** 
Durability - ***  - ***   - ***   
Civil Liberties 
Violations 
+ **  - *** + ** - *** + ***  - *** 
Political 
Freedom 
Violations 
 - ***  - ***  - *** 
State Failure  +***  + ** + *** - ***  + ***  + *** 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Chapter 6 
Discussions and Conclusion 
 In this dissertation, I examined the within-country and between-country effects of 
state-based human rights violations on annual counts of total, fatal and attributed attacks. 
Scholars have argued that state-based human rights violations, as well as other forms of state 
repression and abuse, may increase the likelihood of a terrorist attack. Specifically, many 
have argued that repressive governments that silence dissidents and close all avenues of 
political expression increase the likelihood of terrorism and other acts of violence against the 
state (Gurr, 1970; Crenshaw, 1981; DeNardo, 1985; Piazza, 2017). Persecution of dissenters, 
political imprisonment, and blocking legal expressions of the opposition are examples of how 
a repressive government closes peaceful avenues for expression of political views. Terrorism 
and acts of violence against the state may serve as a defense mechanism against a repressive 
government (Gurr, 1970) or empower existing terrorists (Walsh and Piazza, 2010). 
Additionally, others have argued that state-based violations of human rights can 
damage public approval and perceptions of legitimacy towards the government (Piazza, 
2017). Government repression alienates citizens from their government and can result in 
polarization between government and citizens, and even more so for those citizens who are 
marginalized from larger conventional society (Piazza, 2017). This polarized atmosphere, in 
turn, fosters anti-state and anti-status quo grievances. As a result, the environment created by 
state-based repression becomes beneficial for extremist movements in regard to the gathering 
of support, recruitment of new members, and distribution of effective propaganda, all of 
which may result in increased terrorist attacks at the country-level (Walsh and Piazza, 2010).  
Existing empirical evidence on the relationship between state-based human rights 
violations and terrorism over time indicates countries that engage in higher levels of state-
based human rights violations are also more likely to experience terrorism (Piazza and Walsh, 
   
! 77 
2009; Walsh and Piazza, 2010; Mullins and Young, 2010; Piazza, 2017; Daxecker, 2015). 
However, much of the existing research has not attempted to disentangle the between-country 
or within-country effects of state-based human rights violations on country-level terrorism 
over time. Rather, most studies have estimated models that confound both between and 
within-country effects of state-based human rights violations on terrorism. Additionally, most 
studies have not adequately controlled for unmeasured, unobserved time stable differences 
between countries, and as a result, estimates of time-varying covariates may be biased 
(Allison, 2015). Furthermore, conducting a within-country analysis of state-based human 
rights violations and terrorism provides a much stronger causal test of the relationship, as 
compared to a between-country analysis (Allison, 2015). My research attempts to add to the 
literature on state-based human rights violations and terrorism by examining both within-
country and between-country effects, and by using more up to date data on terrorism. Using 
country-level data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), Amnesty International, Polity 
IV, Freedom House and the World Bank, I examined the following hypotheses for 175 
countries between 1980 and 2014: 
H1: Within-country changes in state-based human rights violations are significantly 
related to within-country changes in total, fatal and attributed terrorism events over 
time, after controlling for other socio-political and demographic variables. Thus, 
countries that experience increases in state-based human rights violations will also 
experience increases in all terrorism outcomes.   
H2: Between-country differences in the level of state-based human rights violations 
are related to increased total, fatal and attributed terrorism events over time, after 
controlling for other socio-political and demographic variables. Thus, countries with 
higher levels of state-based human rights violations, as compared to other countries 
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with lower levels, are more likely to experience annual increases in all types of 
terrorism outcomes. 
6.1 Summary of Within-Country Analyses of State-Based Human Rights Violations on 
Annual Terrorism 
Across all fixed effects models, within-country increases in state-based human rights 
violations were related to increases in annual terrorism attacks—for total, fatal and attributed 
terrorist attacks. State-based human rights violations remained significant even after 
controlling for other socio-political and demographic variables. This is line with results from 
previous studies which have examined the between-country effects of state-based human 
rights violations on changes in terrorism (Walsh and Piazza, 2010; Piazza, 2017). However, 
previous studies have used methods that do not control for time stable unobserved 
heterogeneity between countries and do not fully model or account for those between country 
time stable differences. My results substantially bolster the causal importance of state-based 
human rights violations on terrorism. Additionally, the within-country-level analyses also 
revealed several other variables that are consistently and significantly related to changes in 
annual terrorism over time. Changes in population (+), in overall democracy (+), violations of 
civil liberties (+), regime durability (-), and state failure (+) are also related to changes in 
annual terrorism (see Table 16). In line with previous research, increases in population are 
related to increases in terrorism over time (Chenoweth, 2010; Dreher and Fisher, 2010; 
Compos and Gassebner, 2013; Choi and Luo; 2013; Danzell and Zidek, 2013), as is 
increasing levels of overall democracy (Li and Schaub, 2004; Blomberg and Hess, 2008a; 
Compos and Gassebner, 2013).  
There are two competing theoretical explanations regarding the effects of democracy 
on terrorism. The first explanation, which is referred to as the strategic school, states that 
democratic countries are vulnerable to terrorism due to their commitment to civil liberties 
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(Eyerman, 1998). Democratic countries are also less able than other countries to prevent 
terrorism or retaliate once it occurs due to their commitment to protecting civil liberties and 
political freedom (Eyerman, 1998). The second explanation, which is referred to as the 
political access school, expects the opposite effects of democracy on terrorism (Eyerman, 
1998). The political access school states that democratic countries discourage terrorism 
because there are many non-violent alternatives in these countries to express dissent and 
resolve conflicts. Because conflicts are solved by using non-violent means, there is a lower 
probability of resorting to violence or terrorism to solve conflicts. Generally speaking, most 
studies have found support for the strategic school.  Specifically, many studies have reported 
that democratic countries experience more terrorism, and have more terrorist groups than less 
democratic or more autocratic countries (Li and Schaub, 2004; Blomberg and Hess, 2008a; 
Compos and Gassebner, 2013; Morris and LaFree, 2015). My within-country effects for 
democracy on annual terrorism also supports the strategic school.  
However, although within-country increases in overall democracy are related to 
increased terrorism, my results indicated that within-country increases in civil liberties 
violations are also related to increases in terrorism over time. This finding also lends support 
to the political access school—countries that restrict the public’s freedom of political 
expression, belief, and associational and organizational rights do not provide the public with 
non-violent alternatives to express dissent and resolve conflicts, and as a result, some may 
turn to terrorism or acts of violence against the state as a means. My results are in line with 
those studies that found increased democratic participation (Li, 2005) and protection of civil 
liberties (Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen and Klemmensen, 2006) are related to fewer terrorist 
attacks. Relatedly, my finding is also similar to findings that indicate countries with lower 
levels of civil liberties are more at risk for producing terrorism—that is, countries with higher 
violations of civil liberties also tend to generate more terrorists (Krueger and Laitin, 2008). 
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However, it is important to note that other studies have found that protection of civil liberties 
are positively related to terrorism, a finding that supports the strategic school (Eubank and 
Weinberg, 1994). But, others have argued that such effects are not reflective of civil liberties, 
but rather reflect some other regime attribute related to executive constraints (Li, 2005).!!   
Although the within-country effects for democracy and violations of civil liberties on 
annual terrorism are somewhat contradictory, it is important to note the overall measure of 
democracy is comprised of six components of democracy that reflect competitiveness of 
executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, executive constraints and 
competitiveness of political participation. My measure of civil liberties violations captures a 
country’s restrictions/violations of freedom of expression, associational and organizational 
rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. Thus, although both 
measures are certainly related to each other, they arguably capture different aspects of 
democracies. Relatedly, I did not find any evidence that within-country increases in 
violations of political freedom are related to changes in annual terrorism events. The 
violations of political freedom variable captures state-based restrictions on the electoral 
process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government—aspects of 
democracy that are related yet distinct from civil liberties. My within-country results suggest 
that increases in both state-based human rights violations and state-based civil liberty 
violations are related to increased terrorism over time.  
Additionally, my within-country effects for regime durability and state failure is also 
in line with previous research. Generally, regime durability, measured as the number of years 
since the most recent regime change, is negatively related to terrorism (Eyerman, 1998; Li, 
2005; Piazza, 2008; Young and Dugan, 2011; Morris and LaFree, 2015) and state failure is 
positively and significantly related to terrorism (Lai, 2007; Piazza, 2007; Piazza, 2008; 
Coggins, 2015; Fahey and LaFree, 2015). 
   
! 81 
Results from the analyses examining fatal and attributed attacks were generally 
similar to the results from total attacks. One exception is the significance of urbanization. The 
percent of the population that lives in urban areas is only significantly related to fatal terrorist 
attacks, not total or attributed attacks. This indicates that increases in a country’s urban 
population are also related to increases in the number of terrorist attacks that involve a 
fatality, but it is not related to increases in overall terrorism or attributed terrorist events. This 
intuitively makes sense as terrorists often target areas that can produce mass casualties, 
additionally, urban areas may provide more overall opportunities for terrorist mobilization or 
attacks.  
In sum, results from my fixed effects analysis of annual country terrorism events 
indicates support for Hypothesis 1: Within-country increases in state-based human rights 
violations are associated with increases in annual terrorism attacks of all types. 
6.2 Summary of Between-Country Analyses of State-Based Human Rights Violations on 
Annual Terrorism 
Results from the analyses examining the between-country effects of state-based 
human rights violations on annual terrorism largely mirror the within-country results, with a 
few major exceptions. Importantly, between-country differences in the overall levels of state-
based human rights violations are related to all types of terrorism events over time. Countries 
that have higher levels of state-based human rights violations, as compared to other countries 
with lower levels, have more terrorism over time. Additionally, the following variables were 
also consistently and significantly related to annual terrorism counts in the between-country 
analyses: population (+), urbanization (+), economic development (+) and growth (+), 
democracy (+), violations of civil liberties (-) and political freedom (-), and state failure (+) 
(see Table 16).  
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Countries that are larger, have larger urban populations, are more democratic (both 
overall, and in specific relation to civil liberties and political freedom), more economically 
developed, and have higher levels of state failure have more frequent terrorist attacks over 
time, as compared to those countries with lower levels of these variables. Much of my 
between-country findings are also similar to previously reported findings in the literature. As 
stated earlier, several studies have found that democracy, and countries with more democratic 
components are positively related to terrorism. My between-country effects for economic 
development is also similar to prior research (Tavares, 2004; Blomberg and Hess, 2008a; 
Coggins, 2014). Countries with higher levels of GDP experience higher annual terrorist 
events. However, it is important to note that the existing literature is mixed on the effects of 
economic development and growth on terrorism (Azam and Thelen, 2008; Krueger and 
Maleckova, 2009; Morris and LaFree, 2015).  
Unexpectedly, results from the between-country analysis indicates that a country’s 
overall regime length is not significantly related to increased terrorism. Thus, there is no 
difference in annual terrorism counts for countries with longer regime length, as compared to 
those with shorter regime length. As stated previously, much of the existing research on the 
correlates of country-level terrorism has focused on between-country effects and, with the 
exception of regime durability, my between-country results are similar to those obtained from 
other studies.  
Based on results from all between-country analyses, I found support for Hypothesis 
2—countries with higher overall levels of state-based human rights violations, as compared 
to those with lower levels, will experience increases in annual terrorism. 
6.3 Comparison of Between-Country and Within-Country Results 
There were also notable differences in my findings from the within-country and 
between-country analyses not reported by previous studies. Regime durability, or length of 
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regime type, was consistently related to decreases in annual terrorism events in the within-
country models, but it was consistently not related to terrorism in the between-country 
models. This indicates that although increases in the length of a regime is related to more 
stability and decreased terrorism, the overall length of a regime for a given country is not 
related to decreased terrorism. This may suggest that although yearly increases in regime 
length and stability are related to less terrorism within countries, there comes a tipping point 
or threshold in which further increases in regime length and stability do not impact terrorism. 
This may also lend support to the argument that certain elements of democracy may operate 
in a non-linear or curvilinear fashion (Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen and Klemmensen, 2006).  
Other opposing findings to emerge from the within and between-country level 
analyses pertain to the findings for violations of civil liberties and political freedom. In the 
between-country analyses, countries with more violations of civil liberties and political 
freedom consistently had fewer terrorism events over time across models. Substantively 
similar is the between-country effects for democracy—countries with lower overall 
democracy, compared to those countries with higher levels, also had less annual terrorism 
over time.  
However, in the within-country analyses, countries that experienced increases in 
violations of civil liberties also experienced increases in annual terrorism. Another way of 
interpreting this finding is that during times of increased civil liberty violations, terrorism 
increases as compared to times in which a country increases protections on civil liberties. I 
did not find the same effects for violations of political freedom or overall democracy in the 
within-country analysis. These findings suggest that although countries with lower levels of 
civil liberties and political freedom violations may be more vulnerable to terrorist attacks as 
compared to countries that impose severe restrictions on each (autocratic governments), 
countries that increase civil liberty violations are likely to experience annual increases in 
   
! 84 
terrorism. This is also in line with existing theoretical explanations that argue government 
actions that restrict freedom of speech and the right to assemble may result in increased 
alienation of citizens from government and limited political expression—thus increasing the 
likelihood of terrorism as a defense mechanism against a repressive government.  
6.4 Limitations of the Current Study and Future Research 
 In spite of the benefits of this study, there are numerous limitations that future 
research should attempt to address. First, even though I was able to control for time stable 
unobserved country differences through the use of a fixed effects regression model, I was 
unable to estimate a prior terrorism or lagged terrorism effect. Although some studies have 
included a lagged terrorism variable in a fixed effects regression model predicting terrorism 
(Fahey and LaFree, 2015), Allison and colleagues (2017) have argued that including a lagged 
variable in fixed effects or mixed models can add bias to coefficient estimates. Specifically, 
Allison and colleagues (2017) state that the lagged variable will have an artificially high 
coefficient and it diminishes the effects of any other significant variables. For these reasons, I 
did not use lagged terrorism in the models.17 Instead, I chose to use the fixed effects model to 
control for time stable, unobserved differences between countries that may result in certain 
countries, as compared to others, having higher annual terrorism events. These time stable 
factors may include a predisposition to violence and subsequently terrorism, as well as any 
other time stable country-specific, cultural/social factor. Future research should attempt to 
implement statistical models that allow for the inclusion of lagged terrorism, while also 
implementing a fixed effects regression model.18  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Although I did not include lagged terrorism in the models based on Allison and colleagues 
(2017) argument that doing so introduces bias into the models, I did conduct several analyses 
including lagged terrorism. The substantive findings for state-based human rights violations 
on all outcomes of terrorism were significant. 
18 One potential approach is to estimate a cross-section time-series dynamic panel analysis 
(Allison et al 2017).!!
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Additionally, the fixed effects model only estimates the effects of variables that 
change during the course of the observational period. Thus, I was unable to estimate the 
effects of any time stable variable (e.g., region), or for any variable that exhibits relatively 
little change over the course of the time span (e.g. gini coefficient). Bravo and Dias (2006) 
have argued that it is better to analyze the correlates of terrorism by groups of similar 
countries, such as by region, in order to reduce unobserved heterogeneity and to take into 
account the geopolitical context. Furthermore, political turmoil within a country could 
influence the neighboring countries within the same region, thereby impacting the actions of 
another neighboring state. For example, the political turmoil in Iraq and Syria may have spill-
over effect on those countries within the same region, and may lead to changes in state-based 
violations in neighboring countries. Therefore, future research should examine the correlates 
of terrorism among countries within the same region, and among those countries that are 
close in geographic proximity. This line of research may reveal that the relationship between 
state-based violations of human rights (or other predictors) and terrorism varies by regional 
context.  
A second limitation is that although I initially had 175 countries in the data, once 
including all the independent variables, many of the non-industrialized developing countries, 
compared to developed countries, dropped out of the analysis. Generally speaking, there is 
more complete valid data over time for developed, heavily industrialized countries. Future 
research should continue to utilize up to date data and implement appropriate statistical 
techniques to account for such missing data. 
Third, while other research has found non-linear effects for certain variables such as 
overall democracy and economic development (GDP), I did not examine or account for non-
linear effects of these variables. Relatedly, I did not examine any potential mediating or 
moderating effects among the independent variables and outcome. Future research should go 
   
! 86 
beyond estimating direct relationships and explore the possibility of non-linear, mediating or 
moderating effects among the variables, especially in regards to political and economic 
variables related to terrorism. 
Fourth, some researchers have speculated that terrorism can impact the extent to 
which a state engages in human rights violations. For example, countries that experience 
higher levels of terrorism may be more inclined to restrict human rights in an attempt to 
control and prevent terrorism and other acts of civil disobedience. Walsh and Piazza (2010) 
state that the best way to evaluate endogeneity is to use an instrumental variable or two-stage 
least square techniques that allow for estimation of reciprocal relationships between 
variables. Because Walsh and Piazza (2010) could not identify a suitable instrumental 
variable, they used an alternative approach to evaluate endogeneity. First, they lag the 
variable of interest by one period to ensure that the measure of repression precedes any 
terrorist attack. They also replicated the regressions by lagging all of the independent 
variables by one period. Walsh and Piazza (2010) conclude that there is little evidence for 
such endogeneity. Nonetheless, future research should further explore this issue.  
Fifth, I do not distinguish between domestic and transnational/international terrorism, 
rather I use an aggregate measure that combines both types of terrorism events. Although 
prior studies have found that state-based human rights violations are significantly related to 
both domestic and transnational attacks (Walsh and Piazza, 2010), the theoretical framework 
that expects a relationship between state-based violations of human rights and terrorism 
generally centers on explaining domestic terrorism. However, it is unclear if state-based 
violations of human rights can explain transnational terrorism or if it can explain lone wolf or 
ISIS inspired transnational attacks that target a country that is not responsible for human 
rights violations. However, as Walsh and Piazza (2010) note, US-based actions of abuse 
towards citizens of other countries or suspected terrorists could embolden others to act with 
   
! 87 
violence towards the United States. Thus, further theoretical elaboration is necessary, and 
future research on state-based human rights violations should examine the possibility of 
different effects for different types of terrorism. 
Sixth, I was completely unable to examine the individual-level social psychological 
effects of state-based human rights violations on perceptions and involvement in civil 
disobedience and terrorism. Although this study established a macro-level connection 
between country-level state-based human rights violations and annual terrorism counts, this 
study was not able to shed light on how state repression leads individuals to decide to and 
become involved with terrorist activities. Future research should examine how state-based 
actions impact individual-level decision-making and behaviors. Moreover, future research 
should also examine if state-based human rights violations impact citizens and immigrants 
equally. Because immigrants may be less integrated into society, the reaction of immigrants 
against state-based violations of human rights could differ from the reaction of citizens. 
Similarly, state-based human rights violations may be disproportionately felt by immigrants 
or other ethnic/racial minorities in the population.  
Seventh, I used an aggregate measure of state-based violations of human rights, rather 
than disaggregated measures. The PTS creators acknowledge the importance of 
disaggregating state-based violations of human rights into specific components to evaluate 
how specific types of human rights violations influence terrorism. However, they also state 
that it could be a weakness to give the same scores for different types of human rights 
violations. For example, giving the same score to torture in one country and political 
imprisonment in another does not imply that state-based violations of human rights in these 
two countries are same (Wood and Gibney, 2010). On the contrary, empirical research has 
indicated that certain types of state-based human or physical right violations have more 
impact on terrorism, such political imprisonment and extrajudicial killings (Piazza and 
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Walsh, 2010; Daxecker, 2015).  Future research should further explore if specific types of 
state-based human rights violations have different effects on either the incidence of terrorism, 
or the process of radicalization.  
Finally, there is a possibility that human rights violations may also overlap with 
terrorism measures itself as the measure of state-based human rights violations also includes 
“murders” (Wood and Gibney, 2010, p. 373) which could theoretically be captured in the 
GTD terrorism measures. Although the GTD takes great strides to exclude acts of terrorism 
by the state, it is possible that such events may have been inadvertently included in the total 
attacks measure. In an attempt to address this limitation, I used the attributed attacks outcome 
as a means of including only those acts the GTD has high confidence was a terrorist act not 
committed by the state. Related to this issue, I do not address or treat state-based acts of 
repression or abuse as acts of state-based terrorism. Although others have taken this approach 
(Chomsky, 2006) and there is merit to doing so, I did not take this approach in the current 
study.  
6.5 Policy Implications 
The results from my study, as well as results from the existing literature, point to 
several potential implications for counterterrorism policies. First, as others have argued 
(Walsh and Piazza, 2010), those countries that are actively engaged in counterterrorism 
tactics should temper these activities by also actively protecting human and physical integrity 
rights. Furthermore, my results from the within-country analyses indicates that governments 
that emphasize counterterrorism policies would also benefit from the increased protection of 
civil liberties as well.  
Walsh and Piazza (2010) have argued that state-based human rights violations in the 
form of extrajudicial detention or the use of harsh interrogation techniques against individuals 
suspected of terrorist activity may lead to further terrorist group mobilization. They argue that 
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counterterrorism policies that encroach upon human, physical or civil liberty rights may have 
the unintended effect of leading to increased terrorism. Similarly, others have also argued that 
existing research on human and physical rights violations indicate that any counterterrorism 
tactic that involves torture (stealth or scarring) is not associated with decreased terrorism, 
and, in fact, may have the opposite effect of empowering and mobilizing individuals 
dissatisfied with the government to engage in acts of violence (Daxecker, 2015; Piazza 2017).  
Second, countries may also be able to influence transnational/international terrorism 
by using their resources to promote greater protection of human rights in other countries. 
Although others have certainly speculated that promotion of democracy and economic 
development in other countries may reduce the incidence of terrorism, Walsh and Piazza 
(2010) note that much of the literature does not provide evidence for this belief. Rather, they 
argue that an alternative approach may be for governments to invest in promoting protection 
of human rights abroad. They suggest that countries may be more effective at promoting and 
obtaining small increases in the protection of human rights violations in other countries, as 
opposed to promoting democracy and economic development on other countries, because the 
former involves less changes to the political infrastructure (Walsh and Piazza, 2010). 
Moreover, as it pertains to the United States of America’s involvement abroad in other 
countries, promoting the protection of human rights violations versus democracy (which is 
often a political system associated the USA) may be viewed as less threatening and more 
appealing to citizens of other countries. Rather than promoting ideals often associated with 
the United States of America, perhaps promoting ideals that appeal to all citizens, regardless 
of their existing political and economic system, would be better received by citizens of other 
countries and engender positive perceptions of the United States.  
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Appendix A: 
 
Variables: Operationalization and Sources 
 
 
Table 1 
Variable Operationalization  Source Range 
Total Attacks  The sum of all attacks recorded for 
each year between 1980 and 2014 
for each country 
The Global Terrorism Database 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 
It ranges from 0 to 3925 
where 0 indicates that there is 
no terrorist attack.  
Fatal Attacks  The total number of all attacks that 
resulted in fatalities for each 
year/country 
The Global Terrorism Database 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 
It ranges from 0 to 2518 
where 0 indicates that there is 
no fatal terrorist attack. 
Attributed 
Attacks 
The number of attacks that are 
carried out by a specific group for 
each year/country. 
The Global Terrorism Database 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 
It ranges from 0 to 3370 
where 0 indicates that there is 
no attributed terrorist attack. 
Amnesty 
International 
The violations of physical or 
personal integrity rights carried out 
by a state or its agents, such as 
extrajudicial killing, torture, 
disappearances, and political 
imprisonment.  
The Political Terror Scale 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ 
It ranges from 1 to 5 where 1 
indicates secure rule of law 
while 5 indicates that the 
violations of human rights are 
highly prevalent.  
Population The sum of all residents regardless 
of legal status or citizenship 
excluding refugees not permanently 
settled in the country of asylum.  
The World Bank: World Development 
Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
It ranges from 64,440 to 
1,364,270,000 
! !
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Table 1 
Variable Operationalization  Source Range 
Sex Ratio Male births per female births. The 
data are 5 year averages.  
The World Bank: Gender Statistics 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
It ranges from 1.01 to 1.17 
 
Urbanization The percentage of people living in 
urban areas.  
The World Bank: World Development 
Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
It ranges from 4.333 to 100 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
The probability that two randomly 
drawn individuals in a country 
belong to different ethnolinguistic 
groups. 
Fearon, J. D., and Laitin, D. D. (2003). 
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil 
War. American political science 
review, 97(01), 75-90.  
http://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/pu
blicdata/publicdata.html 
It ranges from 0.001 to 0.925 
Homicide Rate The number of intentional homicides 
per 100,000 people 
The World Bank: World Development 
Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
It ranges from 0 to 139.13 
GDP per capita The gross domestic product divided 
by midyear population 
The World Bank: World Development 
Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
It ranges from 64.81 to 
102,910.435 
GDP Growth The annual increase in the 
percentage of GDP at market prices 
based on constant local currency 
The World Bank: World Development 
Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
It ranges from -64.99 to 
149.97 
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Table.1 
Variable Operationalization  Source Range 
Democracy The place of a country between the 
scale of “strongly democratic” and 
“strongly autocratic” that are measured 
by competitiveness of executive 
recruitment, openness of executive 
recruitment, constraints of chief 
executive, and competitiveness of 
political participation.  
Polity IV 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrd
ata.html 
It ranges from -10 to 10 where 
-10 means “strongly 
autocratic” and 10 means 
“strongly democratic”. 
Regime Durability The number of years since the most 
recent regime change or the end of 
transition period defined by the lack of 
stable political institutions. 
Polity IV 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrd
ata.html 
It ranges from 0 to 205. 
Political Rights 
Violations 
Annual score for political rights based 
on electoral process, political pluralism 
and participation, and functioning of 
government. 
Freedom House. (2016). Freedom in 
the World. Data Retrieved from 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freed
om-world/freedom-world-2016 
It ranges from 1 to 7 where 1 
indicates the strongest 
protection of political rights 
while 7 indicates the lowest. 
Civil Liberties 
Violations 
Annual score for civil liberties based 
on freedom of expression and belief, 
associational and organizational rights, 
rule of law, and personal autonomy and 
individual rights.  
Freedom House. (2016). Freedom in 
the World. Data Retrieved from 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freed
om-world/freedom-world-2016 
It ranges from 1 to 7 where 1 
indicates the strongest 
protection of civil rights while 
7 indicates the lowest. 
State Failure Aggregated annual index of all types of 
state failure events: Revolutionary 
wars, adverse regime changes, ethnic 
wars, and genocides and politicides  
Political Instability Task Force: State 
Failure Program Set 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrd
ata.html 
It ranges from 0 to 13.50 
where 0 indicates there is no 
state failure.  
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Appendix B: 
Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
 
Annual
Total 
Attacks
Annual 
Fatal 
Attacks
Annual 
Attributed 
Attacks
Amnesty 
International
Population Urbanization GDP Percapita GDP growth Democracy Regime Durability Civil Liberties Political Rights State Failure
Pearson Correlation 1.00 0.96** 0.99** 0.26** 0.14** 0.01 )0.05** )0.01 0.08** )0.04** 0.05** 0.01 0.25**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00
N 5518 5514 5518 4460 5400 5402 5107 5057 5105 5157 5458 5458 5481
Pearson Correlation 0.96** 1.00 0.95** 0.25** 0.12** )0.01 )0.06** 0.00 0.04** )0.05** 0.08** 0.04** 0.23**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 5514 5514 5514 4457 5396 5398 5103 5053 5101 5153 5454 5454 5477
Pearson Correlation 0.99** 0.95** 1.00 0.24** 0.14** 0.01 )0.04** 0.00 0.07** )0.03* 0.05** 0.01 0.22**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.34 0.00
N 5518 5514 5518 4460 5400 5402 5107 5057 5105 5157 5458 5458 5481
Pearson Correlation 0.26** 0.25** 0.24** 1.00 0.16** )0.28** )0.42** )0.02 )0.31** )0.27** 0.53** 0.46** 0.51**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 4460 4457 4460 4460 4360 4362 4132 4117 4263 4313 4439 4439 4438
Pearson Correlation 0.14** 0.12** 0.14** 0.16** 1.00 )0.06** )0.03 0.07** 0.01 0.15** 0.04** 0.02 0.06**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00
N 5400 5396 5400 4360 5400 5400 5107 5057 4997 5049 5353 5353 5374
Pearson Correlation 0.01 )0.01 0.01 )0.28** )0.06** 1.00 0.56** )0.08** 0.31** 0.36** )0.40** )0.37** )0.19**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 5402 5398 5402 4362 5400 5402 5107 5057 4999 5051 5355 5355 5376
Pearson Correlation )0.05** )0.06** )0.04** )0.42** )0.03 0.56** 1.00 )0.06** 0.31** 0.60** )0.46** )0.39** )0.16**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 5107 5103 5107 4132 5107 5107 5107 4993 4743 4779 5081 5081 5084
Pearson Correlation )0.01 0.00 0.00 )0.02 0.07** )0.08** )0.06** 1.00 )0.03 )0.02 0.04** 0.04** )0.12**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.53 0.94 0.93 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 5057 5053 5057 4117 5057 5057 4993 5057 4720 4752 5032 5032 5035
Pearson Correlation 0.08** 0.04** 0.07** )0.31** 0.01 0.31** 0.31** )0.03 1.00 0.18** )0.86** )0.89** )0.13**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 5105 5101 5105 4263 4997 4999 4743 4720 5105 5105 5102 5102 5102
Pearson Correlation )0.04** )0.05** )0.03* )0.27** 0.15** 0.36** 0.60** )0.02 0.18** 1.00 )0.32** )0.28** )0.16**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 5157 5153 5157 4313 5049 5051 4779 4752 5105 5157 5154 5154 5154
Pearson Correlation 0.05** 0.08** 0.05** 0.53** 0.04** )0.40** )0.46** 0.04** )0.86** )0.32** 1.00 0.93** 0.30**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 5458 5454 5458 4439 5353 5355 5081 5032 5102 5154 5458 5458 5455
Pearson Correlation 0.01 0.04** 0.01 0.46** 0.02 )0.37** )0.39** 0.04** )0.89** )0.28** 0.93** 1.00 0.24**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.35 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 5458 5454 5458 4439 5353 5355 5081 5032 5102 5154 5458 5458 5455
Pearson Correlation 0.25** 0.23** 0.22** 0.51** 0.06** )0.19** )0.16** )0.12** )0.13** )0.16** 0.30** 0.24** 1.00
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 5481 5477 5481 4438 5374 5376 5084 5035 5102 5154 5455 5455 5481
Democacy
Regime Durability
Civil Liberties
Political Rights
State Failure
Urbanization
GDP Percapita
GDP growth
Table 1
Amnesty 
International
Population
Annual Total 
Attacks
 Annual Fatal 
Attacks
Annual Attributed 
Attacks
